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On October 23, 1993, Johnny Lynn Old Chief and two lady-
friends spent the day driving around the Blackfeet Indian Reserva-
tion in northern Montana in a borrowed truck, hanging out and get-
ting drunk.' At some point, one of the women found a pistol under
one of the seats and pulled it out to play with it.
Late in the day, the group drove to a bar called Ick's Place to
buy more beer. In the parking lot, Mr. Old Chief was challenged to
fight by one Anthony Calf Looking and a friend, who were also
drunk. Calf Looking, the conceded aggressor, hit Old Chief and
knocked him down. At that point, a shot'was fired, though the evi-
dence was in conflict about who had the gun, who fired the shot, and
whether it was fired in the direction of Calf Looking, who fled. Sig-
nificantly, neither Calf Looking nor his companion knew who fired
the shot. No one was injured.
Old Chief left in the truck with the two women. They drove to
an abandoned gas station, where they got out of the truck. Police had
been called by someone at Ick's Bar. The police arrived at the gas
station and found the gun under the seat of the truck. Old Chief was
charged with assault with a dangerous weapon, and with using a fire-
arm during that assault. Because he had a prior felony record, he was
also charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation
* Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. I would like to thank my
colleagues Mark Denbeaux, Edward Hartnett, John Jacobi, and Charles A. Sullivan for
helpful comments on drafts of this article. I would also like to thank my research assistant
Helen Weisgal, especially for her virtuosity with social science databases.
1. A fuller rendition of the facts underlying Old Chief v. United States, 117 S. Ct.
644 (1997), together with an explanation concerning sources, will be found infra at notes
109-16 and accompanying text.
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of 15 U.S.C. section 922(g).
On the morning of April 19, 1995, someone parked a rented Ry-
der truck filled with explosives in front of the Alfred P. Murrah Fed-
eral Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma and detonated it, col-
lapsing the facade and front half of the building and killing 168
people. With a combination of luck and good police work, investiga-
tors found a truck axle with the vehicle's identification number, and
traced it to a truck rental agency in Junction City, Kansas. It had
been reserved on April 15 by someone who had given his name as
"Robert D. Kling." Investigators then turned up a deliveryman for a
local Chinese restaurant who remembered having delivered food or-
dered by "Bob Kling" to a motel room, which the motel records
showed had been rented in the name of one Timothy McVeigh. A
computer check revealed that a Timothy McVeigh had been stopped
for a traffic violation and taken into custody on a weapons charge just
north of Perry, Oklahoma, some seventy-eight miles from the
bombing site,' only seventy-eight minutes after the explosion.' He
was still in custody. He was arrested and charged with participation
in the bombing.
Both the above incidents led to federal criminal indictments and
trials, but beyond that, they seem to have little in common. One in-
cident is among the most horrifying and destructive criminal inci-
dents in the history of the nation, and the other perhaps among the
least. Nevertheless, they have one other thing in common that is of
interest to this paper. Both defendants were faced with charges con-
taining elemental issues that could not be contested effectively.
There was no doubt Old Chief had qualifying felony convictions:
there was no doubt of the actus reus and the mens rea of the perpe-
trators in the Oklahoma City bombing. Further, in both cases the
evidence that might be produced to formally discharge the govern-
ment's burden of production on the incontestable facts was itself
2. Much of the detail in this sketch is contained in the indictment in United States v.
McVeigh, No. CR 95-110-A, 1995 WL 559539, at *1-4 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 10, 1995). The
rest is, unless otherwise noted, common knowledge sourceable through numerous printed
accounts. See, e.g., David Maraniss & Walter Pincus, The Oklahoma City Federal Build-
ing Bombing: Putting the Pieces Together, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 1995, at A20.
3. 77.9 miles, to be exact. See Testimony of Trooper Charles Hanger, 1997 WL
203457, at *37 (D. Col. Trans.) Apr. 28, 1997.
4. The explosion occurred at 9:02 a.m. See Maraniss & Pincus, supra note 2, at A20.
Trooper Hanger testified that he stopped McVeigh about 10:20 a.m. See Testimony of
Trooper Charles Hanger. supra note 3, at *4.
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devastating far beyond the facts themselves. In short, both defen-
dants could benefit from a successful judicial admission.5
Ah, the judicial admission. When I first encountered the notion
nearly thirty years ago, it seemed right to me. It turned out that I
wasn't alone. The great Wigmore's initial response was the same as
mine, though he later seems to have had substantial second thoughts.6
Though usually formulated to apply to trials of every kind, the
operation and logic of the judicial admission mechanism is most
clearly illustrated in the context of a criminal prosecution. Assume a
particularly brutal murder, perhaps one involving child rape, torture,
and mutilation. Assume a defendant who cannot, with any practical
hope of success, contest the existence of the actus reus, nor for that
matter, the perpetrator's criminal state of mind. The only reasonable
defensive position practically available is that he is not the perpetra-
tor of this crime; someone else is; the State has charged the wrong
man. That is, his practical defense is that the evidence will leave a
reasonable doubt regarding the element of identity.7
Should defense counsel understand all this, and even set out this
general position in an opening statement, but take no further more
formal steps, the defense has little chance of excluding any evidence
bearing even remotely on the factual details of the crime charged or
the state of mind of the perpetrator, whoever that might have been.8
Though the defense's opening is admissible as evidence, should the
prosecution so elect, it is by no means legally binding.9 The prosecu-
5. Whether McVeigh's attorneys attempted an actual judicial admission is unclear.
A motion in limine based on Federal Rule of Evidence 403 was filed, but the exact con-
tent of the motion is unknown, since the motion was sealed by the court at the defense's
request and remains sealed as of this writing.
6. See infra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
7. This defensive posture has come to be referred to rather flippantly in recent
years as the "soddi" defense ("some other dude done it"), though of course, it is not tech-
nically an affirmative defense, and it is often deadly serious business, since it is by no
means uncommon that some other dude did do it.
8. See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text (dealing with the one class of cir-
cumstances in which this statement might not be true in some jurisdictions).
9. Wigmore limits his comments to the admissibility of openings in subsequent liti-
gation. See 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM
OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALs AT COMMON LAW § 1063 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter WIGMORE
ON EVIDENCE]. There is language in dictum in some recent opinions that "a clear and
unambiguous admission of fact made by a party's attorney in an opening statement in a
civil or criminal case is binding upon the party." United States v. Blood, 806 F.2d 1218,
1221 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir. 1984)).
Neither Blood nor McKeon involved openings which were given the effect of judicial ad-
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tion still bears the formal burden of producing sufficient evidence to
justify a finding as to each element beyond a reasonable doubt. In
addition, the prosecution, as a party in our particular adversary proc-
ess, has a presumptive right in discharging that burden to choose and
proffer whatever admissible evidence it deems most likely to per-
suade a jury to return a verdict in its favor. Oh, well, yes, it is true
that in the federal system and those states whose rules are modeled
on the Federal Rules of Evidence, there is the possibility of objecting
to individual proffers under Rule 403, the famous probative value-
prejudicial effect balancing test. However, this is unlikely to yield
much for a number of reasons, not the least of which is a rather heavy
thumb on the scale of the balancing test there set out in favor of ad-
missibility."
What to do? Make a formal judicial admission of the elements
constituting the actus reus" and the mens rea. 2 A judicial admission
missions. Both cited the civil case of Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261 (1880) for the
proposition. However, the Court in that case was careful to say that, although in an ap-
propriate case an opening statement might be treated as a judicial admission, judges
should be very careful not to give it such effect if there might be any factual doubt about
the statements so made. See Oscanyan, 103 U.S. at 263. 1 have found no case rendering a
criminal defendant's opening non-traversable per se.
10. Probative value must be "substantially outweighed" by prejudicial effect to jus-
tify exclusion. FED. R. EVID. 403. This significant presumption in favor of the admissi-
bility of problematical evidence was taken from the first version of the Uniform Rules of
Evidence, where "substantially" was inserted in response to criticism that the original
Models Rules of Evidence formulation (without the "substantially") gave judges too
much discretionary power to exclude evidence. See 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5211 (1978). My
own belief is that, while the original formulation might lead to a systemic problem of
overexclusion in some contexts, the political sociology of judicial selection is such that
excluding evidence proffered by the prosecution in a criminal case is unlikely to be such a
context. Former prosecutors tend to be disproportionately represented on the bench.
The failure of Rule 403 (and its state analogues) to control prosecutorial excesses is well
recognized in the literature. See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Right to "'Plead
Out" Issues and Block the Admission of Prejudicial Evidence: The Differential Treatment
of Civil Litigants and the Criminal Accused as a Denial of Equal Protection, 40 EMORY
L.J. 341, 358 n.102 (1991).
11. It is a commonplace practice, and a useful one, that all material elements of a
crime may be classified as actus reus elements (conditions which comprise the objective
existence of the harm toward which the criminal sanction is directed). Note that while the
term actus reus emphasizes acts, it covers non-act elements such as the fact of death in a
murder charge; various status elements such as the defendant's status as a convicted felon
in the Old Chief situation. or the pornographic nature of materials, see infra note 68: mens
rea elements (defining the various subjective states necessary or sufficient to render the
actor guilty); and identity (that the person charged is in fact the perpetrator). See gener-
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is a unilateral declaration that a party will be bound by the admitted
version of jury issues.13 By this, the court is authorized to give a
binding instruction on those issues to the jury.'4 The effect ought to
ally EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCoNDUCr EVIDENCE § 3:01 (1997).
Things become more complicated when we consider burden allocation rules creating de-
fenses, many of which bear on mens rea, or when non-elemental considerations get ele-
vated to quasi-elemental status by variance doctrines, but luckily we may avoid considera-
tion of such variations unless we encounter them.
12. We must here deal with the assertion that is sometimes made, that a person who
claims not to have done an act cannot admit that the act was done with mens rea. The
claim is that such an admission is hopelessly confusing, since if the defendant did not do
the act, he can have no personal knowledge of the mindset of the true culprit. Some
courts have held that the conditional nature of such an admission ("I didn't do it, but if I
did it, then I had mens rea") is in itself a good reason to give it no effect. See, e.g., United
States v. Muniz, 60 F.3d 65, 69 n.2 (2d Cir. 1995); State v. Kappen, 180 N.W. 307, 310-11
(Iowa 1920). At the other extreme, one commentator has argued that the admission
should be effective, but that the jury should be charged only on the other elements, with
no reference to intent at all-which would raise serious jury nullification problems of the
sort dealt with infra note 64 and text accompanying notes 63-67. See Edward G. Mascolo,
Uncharged Misconduct Evidence and the Issue of Intent: Limiting the Need for Admissibil-
ity, 67 CONN. B.J. 281, 307 (1993). I think that both views are wrong, at least in identity
cases. It is true that some defense attorneys, in an attempt to give up as little as possible,
fail to admit what they should. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Stipulations to Exclude Other
Act Evidence: What is Adequate? CRIM. JUST., Spring 1995, at 39. That aside, how con-
fusing is it to be told that the defendant concedes that whoever raped, murdered, and mu-
tilated the little girl committed a horrible crime and obviously did so with culpable evil in
his heart, but the defendant claims that it just wasn't him? This situation can generally be
dealt with effectively by judicial instruction. See United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934,
942 (2d Cir. 1980). For this reason, I am not in favor of anything turning merely on a divi-
sion of admissions between those in the defendant's "actual knowledge" and those not
within "personal knowledge" as outlined (but not necessarily advocated) by Professor
Duane in James Joseph Duane, Stipulations, Judicial Notice, and a Prosecutor's Supposed
"Right" to Prove Undisputed Facts: Oral Argument from an Amicus Curiae in Old Chief v.
United States, 168 F.R.D. 405, 411-12 & n.32 (1996).
13. See 9 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 9, § 2588. The form of expression in
the present article emphasizes the unilateral nature of the judicial admission, though it
may be proffered conditionally upon its acceptance by the opposing party, or by the
judge. In another sense, all judicial admissions are bilateral, whether the opponent likes it
or not, since the admission is addressed to something the opponent is already claiming to
be true. For an excellent discussion unbundling these issues, see Duane, supra note 12, at
417-18.
14. Or is it? The status of a binding instruction on one element in a criminal case is,
in a sense, constitutional terra incognita. On the one hand, it is clear that a full directed
verdict against a criminal defendant would a fortiori violate the jury trial right in criminal
cases, since that right is taken to encompass at least the possibility of jury nullification in
favor of the defendant, and a directed verdict would render this impossible. On the other
hand, the alternative to a binding instruction when a single issue is involved (the permis-
sive inference instruction) has intelligibility and rationality aspects which make it prob-
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render irrelevant (and therefore inadmissible) any evidence relevant
solely to the issues completely established by the admission. There is
no need for the invocation of any balancing test, because there is no
probative value left to balance against any invoked prejudicial effect.
Of course, there are certain practical concerns, since the prose-
cution will predictably not want to be so limited in its proof. If the
judicial admission is phrased in the form of an offer to "stipulate,"
the prosecution may seize upon the agreement-of-parties connotation
of the word in legal parlance to defeat the offer." If there is anything
ambiguous, grudging, or inexplicit in the admission, the prosecution
properly can say that it does not accomplish the asserted purpose.
And of course, in many cases, much of the evidence bearing on the
admitted elements may also be shown to have rational relevance to
the remaining elements, such as, in our example, identification of the
perpetrator. However, by the logic of what we claim to be our proof
system, a properly formulated, ungrudging judicial admission ought
to render inadmissible any evidence which cannot be shown to be at
least slightly relevant to the remaining issue of the identification of
lematical. See Harold A. Ashford & D. Michael Risinger. Presumptions, Assumptions
and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165. 194-202
(1969). For the confusion that can result from regarding permissive inference language as
obligatory, see Peterson v. State, 930 P.2d 414, 436-37 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996). My own
view is that, on balance, the binding instruction is preferable in general, in the context of
non-evidence driven mechanisms like presumptions, judicial notice, stipulations. and judi-
cial admissions, and presents no real constitutional issue as long as the jury is clearly free
to return a general verdict of not guilty. No case I have seen has resolved this issue un-
conditionally. Nevertheless, in a fit of caution (if not analysis), many such instructions
that would be binding in civil contexts are cast in permissive inference terms in cr.minal
contexts, at least in federal practice. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 201(g) (judicial notice). The
majority opinion in Old Chief made the issue disappear by (without explanation) treating
Old Chief's "offer to stipulate" as a practically dispositive evidentiary admission, not as a
true judicial admission. See Old Chief v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 644, 653 (1997). What-
ever the law's default position on such instructions, the rights involved are defendant's
rights, and should not be the source of arguments enuring to the prejudice of defendants.
See infra text accompanying notes 122-126. There has been a series of post-Old Chief
opinions on the propriety of binding instructions based on judicial admissions by criminal
defendants. These opinions have not answered the question, but have concluded, not sur-
prisingly, that if such an instruction is error, it is invited error and always harmless. See
United States v. Saez, 111 F.3d 132 (1997); United States v. Gonzalez, 110 F.3d 936 (2d
Cir. 1997); United States v. Jones, 108 F.3d 668 (6th Cir. 1997).
15. It may seem surprising that such arid characterization could be dispositive, but it
often is. See, e.g., People v. Hills, 532 N.Y.S.2d 269, 273 (N.Y. App. Div.), appeal denied.
534 N.E.2d 340 (1988); State v. Smith, 644 S.W.2d 700, 701 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983).
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the defendant as perpetrator of the crime.16 Our official ideology ac-
counting for and justifying our proof system is the "search for truth"
model (sometimes called, perhaps more accurately, the "rectitude of
decision '17 model), prominently set out in Federal Rule of Evidence
102.8 Whatever the difficulties of this ideology, at a minimum, it
should mean that upon proper objection, evidence that cannot be
shown to provide the jury with any relevant information on the fac-
tual issues they will be called upon to decide and that cannot be
shown to bear on any officially recognized normative function com-
mitted to the jury in such a case,19 should not be admitted (at least
16. I suppose that here is as good a place as any to explain why I have concentrated
so much on cases in which identity is the only real issue. Predicate felon elements aside,
such cases present the clearest commonly encountered situation where judicial admissions
ought to work. In addition, most epistemically troubling (at least to me) death penalty
cases fit this model.
17. The term "rectitude of decision" can more comfortably cover a process which
emphasizes factual accuracy in regard to legal guilt, but which also involves accurate ap-
plication of law to facts, decisional rules which do not always equate the disvalue of false
positives and false negatives, and the use of the jury for certain officially recognized
value-judgment functions. See WILLIAM TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENcE: BENTHAM
AND WIGMORE 47-48 (1985).
18. "These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination
of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of the growth and development of the
law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly deter-
mined." FED. R. EID. 102 (emphasis supplied). Note that the clauses concerning fair-
ness, expense, delay, and development define means subordinate to the ends of truth and
justice. I used to think that the notion of justice intended was the standard notion of jus-
tice under law-accurate application of preexisting substantive law to facts accurately de-
termined-so that like cases (as defined by the applicable substantive law) are treated
alike, and different cases treated appropriately differently. See TWINING, supra note 17,
at 12-18. Now I am less sure.
19. What I mean by an "officially recognized normative function" is involved when
the law explicitly recognizes that it is using the jury as a representative of community con-
science to make certain defined value judgements in regard to a particular issue, no mat-
ter how clear the facts are. The easiest example is negligence. Even if we had a full color,
full sound, full feel, full smell, full taste hologram of an incident, with a cap that would
allow a person to experience the subjective states of the actor, the jury would still have a
legitimate and recognized function. Though everything that could be empirically charac-
terized as a fact would be clear, the jury would still be necessary to decide whether or not
the actor was "careful enough." The presence of such normative jury functions is some-
times indicated by the particularly unhelpful and misleading phrase "mixed question of
law and fact," though what is actually at stake is a "mixed question of fact and value."
The criminal law explicitly recognizes such a role for juries globally for the benefit of de-
fendants only, in the right to the opportunity for jury nullification entailed by the right to
an ultimate general verdict of guilty or not guilty, which cannot be subject to direction or
review on appeal. There is clearly no such explicitly approved general role for juries for
the benefit of the prosecution. This is absolutely true with regard to actus reus and identi-
Jan.1998]
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where there is any significant danger of accuracy distortion resulting
from the evidence).
Ought not be, should not be. It convinced me. It still does. And
it convinced Wigmore initially. In the 1905 first edition of his mighty
treatise he wrote as follows:
A fact that is judicially admitted needs no evidence from the party
benefiting by the admission. But his evidence, if he chooses to offer
it, will even be excluded; first, because it is now as immaterial to the
issues as though the pleadings had marked it out of the controversy;
next, because it is superfluous and merely encumbers the trial; and
furthermore, because the added dramatic force which might some-
times be gained from the examination of a witness to the fact (a
force, indeed, which the admission is often designed especially to
obviate) is not a thing which the party can be said to be entitled
to.
20
However, by the second edition in 1923, something had caused a
change of tune. There, he wrote:
A fact that is judicially admitted needs no evidence from the party
benefiting by the admission. But his evidence, if he chooses to of-
fication elements, but with regard to mens rea and certain traditional affirmative de-
fenses, things start getting fuzzy. Criminal negligence and the recklessness proxy for ac-
tual intent, for example, import such a normative function into the criminal process which
can be exercised to the benefit or either side. This may also be an appropriate way to
view such issues as insanity and diminished capacity. In addition, such a normative func-
tion is present with regard to self defense, at least under an objective standard. Finally,
such a normative role is clearly present when the jury is given a sentencing function.
Nevertheless, it is supposedly a given that the prosecution is not entitled to jury nullifica-
tion of the law in favor of conviction generally. However, one sometimes gets the impres-
sion that many players in the system believe that such a function is appropriate globally
for the benefit of the prosecution also, but they are rarely bold enough to say so openly or
on paper. For an example of a judge coming close, consider the following by Judge Alti-
mar, in United States v. Gilliam, 994 F.2d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 1993):
The jury speaks for the community in condemning such behavior, and it cannot
condemn such behavior if it is unaware of the nature of the crime charged ....
As representatives of the people, the jurors can rebuke the accused for viola-
tions of community standards, morals or principles .... Without full knowledge
of the nature of the crime, the jury cannot speak for the people or exert their
authority. If an element of the crime is conceded and stripped away from the
jury's consideration, the jurors become no more than factfinders. The jury must
know why it is convicting or acquitting the defendant, because that is simply how
our judicial system is designed to work.
This case was cited with apparent approval by the majority in Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 654.
See infra text accompanying note 133.
20. 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2591 (1st ed. 1905).
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fer it, may even be excluded; first because it is now as immaterial to
the issues as though the pleadings had marked it out of the contro-
versy; next, because it may be superfluous and merely cumber the
trial; and furthermore, because the added dramatic force which
might sometimes be gained from the examination of a witness to
the fact (a force, indeed, which the admission is often designed es-
pecially to obviate) is not a thing which the party can be said to be
always entitled to. Nevertheless, a colorless admission by the op-
pone'nt may sometimes have the effect of depriving the party of the
legitimate moral force of his evidence; furthermore, a judicial ad-
mission may be cleverly made with grudging limitations or evasions
or insinuations (especially in criminal cases), so as to be technically
but not practically a waiver of proof. Hence, there should be no
absolute rule on the subject; and the trial Court's discretion should
determine whether a particular admission is so plenary as to render- 21
the first party's evidence wholly needless under the circumstances.
By the third edition in 1940, Wigmore was italicizing the phrase
"moral force of his evidence" for emphasis.' I have my own notion
of the cause of this change of position, and what "legitimate moral
force" Wigmore had in mind,' which we will come to in due course.
Similar considerations apparently account for the construction given
to Federal Rule of Evidence 401 in the last paragraph of the Advi-
sory Committee Note (by no means required by the wording of the
rule itself) that evidence can be relevant even if its only relevance is
to an uncontested fact, asserting that Rule 403 is the proper tool in
such a case (though what can fail to outweigh, even substantially, "no
probative value" is not made clear).
Nevertheless, whatever the conceptual problems, until the recent
21. 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 2591 (2d ed. 1923) (emphasis in original).
22. 9 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 9, § 2591.
23. Professor Fortune, rather hopefully, posits that Wigmore must have meant
"moral force" to mean "probative force," though he gives no reason for this conclusion.
William H. Fortune, Judicial Admissions in Criminal Cases: Blocking Introduction of
Prejudicial Evidence, 17 CRIM. L. BULL. 101, 109 (1981). I am sympathetic, but I don't
believe it. While it is true that the term "moral" was used in that way in the 18th and
early 19th centuries, and even by Greenleaf in the 1840s, see BARBARA J. SHAPIRO,
"BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT" AND "PROBABLE CAUSE" 30-38 (1991), I see no rea-
son to believe that Wigmore was being quite that anachronistic in word selection, without
explanation, when the alternative was obvious. The author of Note, Judicial Admissions,
64 COLUM. L. REv. 1120, 1123-24 (1964) was almost certainly closer to the mark in saying
Wigmore intended that "juries should be permitted to hear such evidence even though by
definition it is irrelevant to the issues to be determined."
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Supreme Court decision in Old Chief v. United States,24 it wasn't even
certain that there would ultimately be any case where the rejection of
a proffered judicial admission would count as reversible error in the
federal system,2' and it is unclear whether Old Chief ought to be re-
garded as a cup more empty than full. Before dealing with the
meaning of these things, however, we should look at the history of
judicial admissions a little more closely.
History
It is somewhat surprising that the judicial admissions doctrine
seemed like a good idea to Wigmore in the first place. The roots of
the doctrine trace back to civil pleading practice, where individual
allegations could be admitted formally by specific pleading, and
thereafter bind the admitting party and limit the evidence.2 6 How-
24. 117 S. Ct. 644 (1997). As will be discussed at length infra. in Old Chief. the Court
decided, in a 5-4 decision, that an "offer to stipulate" to the predicate felon status in-
volved in a charge of being a convicted felon in possession of a gun could not be "'re-
jected" by the prosecution and could be sufficient to render proof of the particular convic-
tions inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. However, in so doing, the
majority treated the "offer to stipulate" as if it involved a normal evidentiary admission
which was thus only practically dispositive of the issue admitted rather than legally dis-
positive. (I suppose this can be taken to mean that there is not, technically, any true judi-
cial admission doctrine at all in federal criminal cases.)
25. On the issue presented in Old Chief itself, which, as we will see, is among the
most clearly persuasive in favor of allowing an effective judicial admission, the circuits
were sharply divided, with the First, Fourth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits al-
lowing it and the Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth rejecting it. Compare United States v. Wacker,
72 F.3d 1453, 1472-73 (10th Cir. 1995), United States v. Jones, 67 F.3d 320, 323 (D.C. Cir.
1995), and United States v. Tavares, 21 F.3d 1, 3-6 (1st Cir. 1994) (en banc), with United
States v. Breitkreutz, 8 F.3d 688, 690 (9th Cir. 1993), United States v. Burkhart, 545 F.2d
14, 15 (6th Cir. 1976), and United States v. Smith, 520 F.2d 544, 548 (8th Cir. 1975). On
the other major area of judicial admissions application to propensity evidence, the Mo-
lineux-type case, the circuits are likewise split. See infra note 37.
26. See generally Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 347-49. The extension of the judi-
cial admissions doctrine beyond the pleading context is also old. Philips on Evidence.
originally published in 1814, indicates that an admission by an attorney "with intent to
obviate the necessity of proving the fact" is binding. See 1 S. MARCH PHILLIPS. A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE Ch. 5, § 4, at 105 (New York, Gould, Banks & Co.
eds.. 4th Am. ed. 1839). Greenleaf, in his influential 1842 treatise, wrote as follows:
The admissions of attorneys of record bind their clients, in all matters relating to
the progress and trial of the cause. But to this end they must be distinct and
formal, or such as are termed solemn admissions, made for the express purpose
of alleviating the stringency of some rule of practice, or of dispensing with the
formal proof of some fact at the trial.
1 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 186 (Boston. Little,
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ever, historically (in order to free a criminal defendant from the dan-
gers of common law civil pleading) the only pleas allowed a criminal
defendant were "guilty" or the general issue of "not guilty." As a
side effect of this, no judicial admission procedure was available to
the criminal defendant at the pleading stage, since the general "not
guilty" plea was a formal denial of every allegation in the indict-
ment.27
When Wigmore first wrote, judicial admissions apparently were
not commonly attempted in criminal cases, and on those occasions
when courts addressed the question, they generally rejected the no-
tion. As Wigmore's own footnotes show, he knew the American
precedents appear to have stood heavily against the use of unilateral
judicial admissions in the criminal trial setting at the time of his initial
writing.' Nevertheless, Wigmore formulated the doctrine generally
and trans-substantively in the text, almost certainly taking Green-
leaf's language set out in note 26 as a guide.'
Brown eds., 2d ed. 1844) (1842). It is easy to take this statement as defining a doctrine
both trans-substantive and potentially unilateral. However, when the issue arose in actual
cases, 19th century courts did not generally go along. See infra note 29.
27. See Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 353-56.
28. It is difficult to know for sure, since successful admissions by criminal defendants
would not normally end up being reflected in appellate opinions.
29. See People v. Fredericks, 39 P. 944, 946 (Cal. 1895); State v. Powell, 64 A. 966
(Del. 1904); Higgins v. State, 60 N.E. 685, 687 (Ind. 1901); Trogden v. State, 32 N.E. 725,
726 (Ind. 1892); State v. Jones, 56 N.W. 427, 429 (Iowa 1893); State v. Winter, 34 N.W.
475, 478 (Iowa 1887); State v. Valsin, 16 So. 768, 768 (La. 1895); Commonwealth v. Cos-
tello, 120 Mass. 358, 369 (1876); Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 119 Mass. 354, 355 (1876);
Commonwealth v. Miller, 57 Mass. (3 Cush.) 243, 251 (1849); People v. Thompson, 61
N.W. 345, 345 (Mich. 1894). (Wigmore cited only Miller and Costello. See 4 WIGMORE,
supra note 20, § 2591 n.1. Even on the civil side, the cases were against him, as best rep-
resented by the opinion in Dunning v. Maine Cent. R.R. Co., 39 A. 352, 356 (Me. 1897),
quoted in the footnote.) In 1904, the Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure had adopted a flat
statement to the effect that admissions could be rejected by the opponent. See H.C. Un-
derhill & Win. Lawrence Clark, Criminal Law, in 12 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW &
PROCEDURE 70, 391 (William Mack ed., The American Law Book Co. 1904). The one
case Wigmore cites in support of the text, Dean v. State, 8 So. 38 (Ala. 1890), is discussed
infra note 32. Though many of the above decisions could have been arrived at by finding
that the admission tendered did not go far enough to eliminate the relevance of the evi-
dence proffered, their general rationale was the right of an opponent to reject the prof-
fered admission and rely on the evidence sought to be excluded instead.
30. Wigmore was the editor of volume one of the 16th (last) edition of Greenleaf's
treatise, see 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (John Henry
Wigmore ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1899), and it was in this volume that the
quoted language appears. Moreover, in Wigmore's own addition to section 169 of
Greenleaf's treatise on general principles concerning admissions, we find his first edition
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Wigmore is hardly chargeable with being some bleeding heart
who bent over backwards for criminal defendants.3 There are a
number of factors which may have accounted for his original formu-
lation. First, he generally supported broadly applicable trans-
substantive evidence rules. Second, he generally supported doctrines
that brought what he saw as efficiency to the trial process. Third, in
the one case that he cited for the application of the judicial admis-
sions doctrine in the criminal context, the judicial admission had been
made by, and had operated in favor of, the prosecution. - Finally, as
previously noted, it may have just seemed right.
Between the first and the second editions, the original formula-
tion was fairly generally rejected by the courts and by other commen-
33tators. Further, it does not seem unlikely that some of his friends on
position foreshadowed as follows:
A deliberate and formal waiver, made usually in court or by writing preparatory
to trial, by the party or his attorney, by conceding for the purposes of trial the
truth of some alleged fact, has the effect of a confessory pleading, in that the fact
is thereafter to be taken for granted and the other party need offer no evidence
to prove it. This is what is commonly termed a solemn-i.e. ceremonial or for-
mal-or judicial admission, and is in truth, as above suggested, a substitute for
evidence, in that it does away with the need for evidence.
Id. § 169, at 291.
31. He was a founder of the Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Sci-
ence, and of the Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory of the Chicago Police Depart-
ment. It is fair to say that he generally appeared more comfortable approaching criminal
law issues from the law enforcement perspective than from that of the defense. See gen-
erally William R. Roalfe, John Henry Wigmore-Scholar and Reformer, 53 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 277 (1962).
32. See Dean v. State, 8 So. 38, 39 (Ala. 1890). The case is too strange to mean
much. It involves affirmance of a judge who allowed a prosecutor to defeat a motion for
continuance by admitting the content of an absent witness' testimony. Wigmore might
better have cited Cole v. State, 75 S.W. 527, 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 1903),followed in Cren-
shaw v. State, 85 S.W. 1147,1149 (Tex. Crim. App. 1905), and Melton v. State, 83 S.W. 822.
823 (Tex. Crim. App. 1904), three Texas cases mandating that a defense admission of the
nature and position of wounds would keep out the deceased's bloody clothes. Wigmore
might also have cited State v. Vance, 94 N.W. 204, 204-05 (Iowa 1903), a Molineur-type
case with the added attraction of a formal admission of intent. For a discussion of the
Molineux case, see infra note 35.
33. It may be a mistake to say that Wigmore's position was rejected, since there is
little direct evidence that it was even considered. I have found 23 cases from 1905 to 1923
where admission or practical concession played a part. They are listed and analyzed in
Appendix 1. Of these, even in the cases consistent with Wigmore's section 2591, it was
not cited (although other sections of the treatise occasionally are). Ironically, it was cited
in a string cite without discussion in State v. Lewis, 116 N.W. 606, 607 (Iowa 1908). which
went the other way. It is worth remembering that when Wigmore's four volume first edi-
tion was published in 1904-05, it was just another entry in the competition for practitioner
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the law enforcement side may have explained to Wigmore how pro-
foundly the doctrine as originally formulated would affect traditional
modes of presentation in some cases, generally to the practical detri-
ment of conviction.
Whatever the reasons, the retrenchment of the second edition
text is clear. In the seventy-five years since the second edition, re-
ported decisions reflect that few criminal defendants have been suc-
cessful in excluding any evidence on this basis.Y More importantly,
and library dollars. It was neither the most complete (Camp's massive 14 volume Ency-
clopedia of Evidence was published nearly simultaneously), the most novel (Thayer or
Stephen probably held that distinction), nor immediately the most popular. In the crimi-
nal field, that palm probably went to Wharton's Criminal Evidence. When O.N. Hilton
(of the Denver Bar) revised that work in 1913, he added a new section which showed that
he had probably been reading Wigmore even if he wouldn't cite him. If so, Hilton was
clearly not happy with what he had read:
It is error to exclude relevant evidence tending to prove or disprove the issues,
although the facts are admitted. Notwithstanding the admission, the prosecution
has a right to prove the charge by competent evidence of the facts admitted ....
Facts, when admitted, frequently lose their probative force, and are frequently
admitted for this reason alone.
1 FRANCIs WHARTON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 24c (O.N. Hilton ed., 10th
ed. 1912). Thereafter, both the first edition of Corpus Juris (1920) and Ruling Case Law
(1920) adopted flat statements consistent with Hilton's text in Wharton's Criminal Evi-
dence. See 26 R.C.L. Trial § 40 (William M. McKinney & Burdett A. Rich eds., 1920); 22
C.J.S. Evidence § 370 (William Mack & William Benjamin Hale eds., 1920).
34. In 1934, an American Law Reports annotation: Offer of defendant in criminal
case to concede or stipulate fact, or his admission of same, as affecting prosecution's right to
introduce evidence thereof, 91 A.L.R. 1478 (1934), collected 26 cases of explicit or implied
admission, and found defendants successful in only one. They generally did not include
cases where courts excluded evidence based not on admission, but on the virtual incon-
testability of the issue toward which the admission was supposedly directed, see infra
note 37, and they missed some cases on both sides (on the ineffectiveness of the admis-
sion: State v. Powell, 61 A. 966 (Del. 1904); Higgins v. State, 60 N.E. 685, 687 (Ind. 1901);
State v. Lewis, 116 N.W. 606, 607 (Iowa 1908); State v. Winter, 34 N.W. 475, 478 (Iowa
1887); State v. Moore, 102 P. 475, 476 (Kan. 1909); People v. Thompson, 61 N.W. 345, 345
(Mich. 1894); on successful admissions: State v. Vance, 94 N.W. 205 (Iowa 1903); all but
one of the line of Texas cases springing from Cole v. State, 75 S.W. 527 (Tex. Crim. App.
1903) (representing a doctrine now unfortunately no longer living in either Texas or
Iowa); and perhaps People v. Washburn, 286 P. 711 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1930)).
Still, the pattern is clear. When Wall wrote in 1962, he was able to point to seven
post-1934 cases rejecting proffered admissions and none in which such admissions had
worked on behalf of criminal defendants to exclude evidence. See Patrick M. Wall, Judi-
cial Admissions: Their Use in Criminal Trials, 53 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE
SCI. 15 (1962). Nor did the author of the 1964 Columbia note on judicial admissions, see
supra note 23, cite any such cases. Similarly, Professor Fortune, see supra note 23, writ-
ing in 1981, cited no such cases of successful judicial admissions between 1934 and the
mid-1970s. (These latter cases will be dealt with infra notes 37, 65 and accompanying
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most of those cases where judicial admissions were successful were
what we will call Molineux-type cases," which are best viewed as in-
text.) Giannelli and Imwinkelried, in Paul C. Giannelli & Edward J. Imwinkelried.
Stipulations in Criminal Cases, CRIM. DEF. 3, May-June 1983, at 4-5. cited two such cases:
United States v. White, 355 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1966), and Beagles v. State, 273 So. 2d 796
(Fla. App. 1973). Doubtless in the welter of a half century of reports there were other
cases not cited by the above authorities, with rejections preponderating. See, e.g..
McHugh v. State, 301 So. 2d 238, 243 (Ala. 1974): Stallings v. State, 32 So. 2d 233, 235
(Ala. 1946); Brewer v. State, 608 S.W.2d 363, 368 (Ark. 1980); State v. Hokenson. 527
P.2d 487, 489 (Idaho 1974); Commonwealth v. Valcourt, 133 N.E.2d 217, 221 (Mass.
1956); People v. Fuller, 205 N.W.2d 287, 289 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973): see also People v.
Mills, 3 N.W.2d 909, 919 (Mich. 1995); State v. Smith, 644 S.W.2d 700, 701 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1983). For successful judicial admissions, see Oxendine v. State, 335 P.2d 940. 943
(Okla. Crim. 1958); Dyken v. State, 89 So. 2d 866, 866 (Fla. 1956). Again, the trend is
clear.
35. There are a lot of Molineux principles, of which this is perhaps the least famous.
The Molineux case was one of the most notorious criminal cases of the turn of 19th cen-
tury America. Roland B. Molineux, scion of a wealthy and influential family headed by
Civil War hero Gen. E. L. Molineux, was accused of murdering Mrs. Kate Adams. Ad-
ams died after taking a dose of Bromo-seltzer laced with cyanide of mercury which had
been anonymously sent to Harry Cornish, Molineux's hated rival for influence at the
Knickerbocker Athletic Club. It turned out that Molineux was associated with a couple
of other sudden deaths consistent with poisoning, involving rivals for the hand of his re-
cent bride. The most suggestive one was the death of Henry C. Barnet, another member
of the Knickerbocker Athletic Club. Barnet had died six months before Mrs. Adams. af-
ter consuming a dose of poisoned Kutnow powder, another patent headache remedy, sent
to him anonymously. The evidence indicated that Molineux had rented a private postbox
in Barnet's name, using it to receive samples of patent remedies for impotence. He had
also received Kutnow powder through that postbox, consistent in type and time with that
later sent to Cornish. Further, there was evidence that Molineux had also rented a box in
Cornish's name after Barnet's death, and received more impotence remedies there, but
no bromo-seltzer. Molineux was tried and convicted (there was, of course, much more
evidence on both sides). On appeal, the conviction was reversed. See People v. Mo-
lineux, 61 N.E. 286 (N.Y. 1901). Prominent among the grounds for reversal in the opinion
of the court was the introduction of the evidence concerning the Barnet circumstances in
the trial charging only the death of Adams. Molineux became a leading case in the devel-
opment of the propensity rule in the United States, being cited and/or criticized in count-
less cases, articles and texts. See, e.g., IMWINKELRIED, supra note 11, § 2:27. Its rele-
vance to our subject springs from the fact that the court, having disposed. rightly or
wrongly, of the general principles, took on the prosecution's claim that the prior circum-
stances were admissible to prove intent, or lack of mistake or accident. The court prop-
erly observed that no question concerning such issues was raised by the defense, or was
even tenable, in a case involving anonymously mailing poison in a bottle carefully dressed
up to look like a normal bromo-seltzer container:
It would be a travesty upon our jurisprudence to hold that, in a case of such ap-
palling and transparent criminality, it could ever be deemed necessary or proper
to resort to proof of extraneous crimes to anticipate the impossible defense of
accident or mistake. The same irrefutable logic of fact and circumstance that es-
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volving a presumption independent of actual concession or judicial
admission. It applies when the prosecution seeks to put in uncharged
misconduct evidence supposedly to show intent,36 or lack of accident
or mistake when lack of intent, accident, or mistake are unasserted
and untenable. 7
tablishes felonious intent as clearly negatives the possibility of accident or mis-
take.
Molineux, 61 N.E. at 298-99. On retrial, Molineux was acquitted, a result which remains
controversial, a la Lizzie Borden and O.J. Simpson. It also seems likely many courts
would approve admission of the Barnet evidence today. In fact, the Molineux court was
equally divided on the bottom-line question of the admissibility of the Barnet evidence,
but agreed on reversal for other reasons. See id. at 312-17 (Parker, C.J., concurring and
Gray, J., concurring). For a more complete account, see AMERICAN TRIALS: THE
MOLINEUX CASE (Samuel Klaus ed., 1929).
36. Some courts have limited the principle to general, as opposed to specific, intent.
See IMWINKELREID, supra note 11, § 8:13. As a general rule, this seems disingenuous, at
least in identity cases, since lack of specific intent is often as clearly untenable on the facts
as lack of general intent. Presumably the capital murder in Molineux was a specific intent
crime. There is substantial academic criticism of this limitation of the doctrine to general
intent. See id& § 8:13 n.11 (citing critical authorities). The Supreme Court has recognized
the general ambiguity and unhelpfulness of the distinction. See United States v. Bailey,
444 U.S. 394, 403-04 (1980). The Seventh Circuit has explicitly abandoned it for Mo-
lineux-type cases. See United States v. Kramer, 955 F.2d 479, 490-91 (7th Cir. 1992).
37. Even in the Molineux situation, decisions are by no means uniform. See
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 11, § 8:13. Nor have Molineux-type decisions been all that
common. Professor McCormick appears to have been a supporter of this doctrine, and
perhaps of its extension. In the 1954 first edition of his treatise, he wrote:
[W]hen the crime charged involves the element of knowledge, intent or the like,
the state will often be permitted to show other crimes in rebuttal, after the issue
is sharpened by the defendant's giving evidence of accident or mistake, more
readily than it would as part of its case in chief at a time when the court may be
in doubt that any real dispute will appear on the issue.
CHARLES MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 331 (1954). Notice the
inclusion of knowledge generally, and the lack of limitation of intent to general intent.
McCormick cited only two cases of such exclusion, State v. Gilligan, 103 A. 649 (Conn.
1918), and an English case, Thompson v. The King, 1918 App. Cas. 221 (appeal taken
from K.B.), where Lord Sumner said, "The mere theory that a plea of not guilty puts eve-
rything material in issue is not enough for this purpose. The prosecution cannot credit the
accused with fancy defenses in order to rebut them at the outset with some damning piece
of prejudice." Id. at 232. In the second edition, the editors included the same passage
with no new cases. See CHARLES MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE 452 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972). There were more cases
than that, but they were by no means common. See, e.g., People v. Mangano, 30 N.E.2d
428, 429-30 (Ill. 1940); State v. Strum, 169 N.W. 373, 375-76 (Iowa 1918); State v. Vance,
94 N.W. 204, 205 (Iowa 1903). Many cases rejected the doctrine altogether. See, e.g.,
People v. Sindici, 201 P. 975, 976 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App 1921); People v. Munday, 127 N.E.
364, 371 (Ill. 1920). (Iowa abandoned the approach in State v. Kappen, 180 N.W. 307
(Iowa 1920).) More modem authorities indicate that the states remain substantially split.
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There is reason to believe, however, that below the horizon of
reported cases, the judicial admission tactic continued to bubble
along, with occasional success at the trial level. Evidence for this
comes first, ironically, from the decisions rejecting the argument on
appeal.38 Second, there was the hopeful tone, on almost no evidence,
of the little literature generated by the question.39 (I mean, it seems
so right.)
A major factor in resuscitating the judicial admission option, at
For example, Wisconsin accepts the principle by rule, see Wisc. R. Evid. 404(b) (requiring
that the issue toward which such evidence is directed be "'substantially disputed"), and
New Jersey by decision, see State v. Cofield, 605 A.2d 230, 235 (N.J. 1992). Tennessee
and Utah, however, reject it. See State v. Smith, 644 S.W.2d 700, 701 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1983): State v. Florez, 777 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah 1989). However, the Molineux principle
has had something of a renaissance since the mid 1970's, at least in some federal circuits,
especially if accompanied by an actual attempt at judicial admission by the defendant.
The doctrine has been broadly embraced in the First, Second, Eighth, Eleventh. and D.C.
Circuits, and somewhat less expansively in the Third. The Fifth Circuit has a long line of
cases going back and forth. The Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits give the doctrine
short shrift. The cases are collected and analyzed in United States v. Crowder, 87 F.3d
1405 (D.C. Cir. 1996), vacated and remanded in light of Old Chief v. United States, 117 S.
Ct. 760 (1997). See also Note, Balancing the Scales: Limiting the Prejudicial Effects of
Evidence Rule 404(b) Through Stipulation, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 389, 393-402 (1994)
(concentrating on the two most extremely conflicting positions, those of the Second and
the Ninth Circuits); and Vivian M. Rodriguez, Note, The Admissibility of Other Crimes,
Wrongs or Acts under the Intent Provision of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The
Weighing of Incremental Probity and Unfair Prejudice, 48 U. MIAMI L. REv. 451 (1993).
In 1992, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a Molineux-type case, United States v.
Hadley, 918 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 503 U.S. 958 (1992). The case in-
volved admission of prior (by ten years) incidents of sexual molestation of young men in
the defendant's care, supposedly to show intent on the current charges. Since the charged
acts, at least in part, included anal penetration, it was hard to imagine how they were sup-
posed to be without mens rea, general or specific, and the defendant was willing to admit
that whatever he did was done with requisite intent. The facts of the case are remarkably
similar to one of the earliest Molineux-type cases, State v. Vance, 94 N.W. 204 (Iowa
1903). After argument, the writ was dismissed as improvidently granted. See 506 U.S. 19
(1992). (Today the evidence would presumably be admissible under Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 414.) The effect, if any, of Old Chief on Molineux-type cases is considered infra
note 128.
38. Litigators will keep pitching anything that either seems like it ought to work, or
which might work only rarely, as long as it costs little in time or effort. Hence the routine
polling of juries after convictions, for instance. (I actually saw a juror change a vote dur-
ing a poll once, but undoubtedly it is exceedingly rare.)
39. The state of the cases is discussed supra notes 34 and 37. Nevertheless, Wall, su-
pra note 34, Fortune, supra note 23, and Gianelli and Imwinkelried, supra note 34. were
all generally positive toward the potential for the judicial admission to work. (It should
be noted that the latter two articles were written as the more receptive attitude of some
courts was gaining momentum.)
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least in federal courts, was the increasing prosecution of predicate
felon crimes.40 Predicate felon crimes make it illegal for persons
having the status of convicted felons to do acts which may be legal for
average citizens.4 Because convicted felons status is an element of
the offense, the plea of not guilty puts it in issue and allows the
prosecution to prove it by evidence. Since any previous felony con-
viction satisfies the condition, if there are numerous such convictions
the prosecution is initially free to prove each of them.' Even if lim-
ited to less than all, the prosecution is presumptively free to choose
40. Specifically, in the federal context, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
It may be a slight overstatement to attribute the resuscitation to the predicate felon situa-
tion, since the Molineux renaissance was occurring in parallel. The first swallow of the
Molineux spring was United States v. DeCicco, 435 F.2d 478, 483-84 (2d Cir. 1970), but it
did not really blossom until United States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246, 1248-49 (2d Cir.
1977). Similarly, the first suggestion that an admission ought to be successful in a felon-
in-possession case is found in United States v. Cook, 538 F.2d 1000, 1005 (3d Cir. 1976),
but the first true success was not until United States v. Poore, 594 F.2d 39, 43 (4th Cir.
1979).
41. There have been other status element crimes, often dealing with race (miscege-
nation laws, etc.), but only those having the status element of "convicted felon" create
the propensity carry-over problems which can be attacked by judicial admission. Disabili-
ties placed upon convicted felons which potentially carry criminal sanctions may include
such things as voting rights, but the statutes which create the problems dealt with in this
article are possessory restrictions on weapons, most notably firearms. These statutes are
of fairly recent origin. The earliest appears to be a 1922 California statute descended
from an earlier 1917 sentencing enhancement statute. Compare People v. Smith, 171 P.
696, 697 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1918) (1917 statute), with People v. Camperlingo, 231 P. 601,
602 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1924) (1922 statute). (It was definitely not New York's Sullivan
law, as suggested in Susan W. Callan, Note, Inherent Prejudice of a "Felon-in-Possession"
of a Firearm Trial: Bifurcation, Stipulation, and Jury Instruction as Effective but Judicially
Rejected Remedies, 28 Rutgers L.J. 201, 203 (1996). The Sullivan Law was a general li-
censing law for concealable weapons. See People ex. rel. Darling v. Warden of City
Prison, 139 N.Y.S. 277 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1913)). Over the course of time, almost all Ameri-
can jurisdictions have adopted some such statute, at least for some types of felons under
some circumstances. See generally ROGER KESSINGER, FIREARMS LAWS: A STATE-BY-
STATE AND FEDERAL SUMMARY (Kessinger Publishing 1990). The federal government
first passed such a statute limited to those convicted of a "crime of violence" in 1938, see
United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 263 (4th Cir. 1942), and extended it to most (but not
quite all) convicted felons in 1968, see generally CLAYTON E. CRAMER, FOR THE
DEFENSE OF THEMSELVES AND THE STATE 65-66 (Praeger 1994); Deborah S. Prutzman,
Note, Prior Convictions and the Gun Control Act of.1968, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 326 (1976).
42. See United States v. Washington, 992 F.2d 785, 788 (8th Cir. 1993). Even after
Old Chief, the Eighth Circuit has approved requiring the admission to be that the defen-
dant has been convicted of "one or more" convictions, so that the admission would not
"mislead the jury" when the defendant in fact has multiple convictions. See United States
v. Einfeldt, No. 97-1650, 1998 WL 94945, at *1 (8th Cir. Mar. 6, 1998). How the jury
would be mislead as to anything it has a right to consider is not made clear.
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the conviction closest to any other crime joined for trial with the
predicate felon charge. Lastly, proof is usually by certified copy of
the judgement of conviction, which may in a given jurisdiction con-
tain information on the underlying crime beyond mere conviction.
such as particulars concerning the individual episode or the sentence
imposed, and may or may not be subject to redaction in those re-
gards.43 Thus the predicate felon charge puts a powerful weapon in
the prosecution's hands to introduce evidence of the sort generally
explicitly forbidden by the propensity rule, and to do it in circum-
stances where the element of predicate felon status is uncontestable
and uncontested by the defendant. An expanded examination of the
facts in Old Chief's case will show just how extreme such a situation
can be, but first we must turn to a more formal examination of the
various contexts in which a judicial admission might reasonably be
proffered by a criminal defendant.
Taxonomic Interlude
There are various possible ways to organize the contexts in
which judicial admissions may be proffered in criminal cases.
One initial consideration might be the types of evidence that a
proffered judicial admission might be directed against. There are
generally two categories of information which may precipitate an at-
tempted judicial admission: propensity evidence, and what we may
call "heartstrings and gore" evidence.44 An admission directed to-
43. See, e.g., Parker v. State. 408 So. 2d 1037, 1038 (Fla. 1982) (approving, in a state
felon-in-possession case, both the rejection of defendant's proffered judicial admission
and proof of felon status by submission of the entire judgment of conviction document.
complete with any details it might contain as to the charges, the episode itself, or the sen-
tence. without redaction). Redaction was suggested by the majority in Old Chief as a pos-
sible alternative to judicial admission, see Old Chief v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 644, 655
n.10 (1997), but a sufficiently redacted document is going to be a pretty odd looking ex-
hibit, likely creating more jury speculation problems than it is worth.
44. I have used the phrase "heartstrings and gore" to cover the range of emotionally
riveting proffers engaging sympathy and revulsion with little real evidential content.
"Heartstrings" is best represented by the widow called to identify the deceased victim
from a photograph (who often predictably breaks into tears). See, e.g., Wycoff v. Nix, 869
F.2d 1111, 1113 (8th Cir. 1989): Brewer v. State. 608 S.W.2d 363, 366 (Ark. 1980): People
v. Villa, 125 Cal. App. 3d 872 (1981) (admitting evidence of rape victim's injuries despite
defendant's offer to stipulate to great bodily injuries); People v. MacPherson, 35 N.W.2d
376, 379-80 (Mich. 1949): State v. Seyboldt, 236 P. 225, 230-31 (Utah 1925). "Gore"
needs no explanation to anyone who has seen color crime scene photos. Technology has
expanded our ability to bring heartstrings and gore into the routine case, and continues to
expand as police departments supplement still photography with videotape. See Mark
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ward propensity evidence (as in Old Chief) attempts to remove the
formally asserted, but often pretextual, non-propensity reason for its
proffer in order to obtain exclusion, because the only remaining use
for the evidence is the forbidden propensity use (which is usually the
main benefit sought by the prosecution in the first place). In the pro-
pensity situation, the admission play is backed up by a generally rec-
ognized categorical policy of exclusion, even though the excluded in-
formation is not wholly irrelevant by anyone's definition, nor the
excluded benefit wholly irrational. In the "heartstrings and gore"
situation (like the child rape-murder), the law's actual position is
much more ambiguous concerning the impropriety of the benefit ac-
tually sought by the proponent, even though, ironically, unlike pro-
pensity evidence, the benefit is not rational in any easily identified
sense. While it would seem that, in a clear enough case, the "heart-
strings and gore" evidence ought to be more easily excludable than
the propensity evidence, as we shall see, the opposite is in fact the
case.
In addition to the type of evidence toward which the admission is
directed, the nature of the admitted issue is also of significance. Pro-
fessor Fortune believes that the most important cleavage is between
judicial admissions of elements and judicial admissions of mediate
facts." He would generally require the acceptance of properly for-
mulated elemental admissions, while leaving the acceptance of medi-
ate fact admissions to the mercies of a more traditional Rule 403 bal-
ancing process.
The distinction between elemental and mediate admissions is a
good place to start. Certainly the proportion of mediate fact admis-
sions which turn out to be attempts at legerdemain is higher than in
the case of ultimate fact admissions. 46 But I am not so sure that there
Curriden, Crime Scene Videos: Dead Bodies on Videotape Worry Criminal Defense Law-
yers, 76 A.B.A. J., May 1990, at 32. In one regard technology has perhaps reduced the
gore. There are fewer cases in which actual body parts are exhibited in court (at least
from dead bodies), which occurred on occasion in the 19th century when there was a spe-
cific evidentiary need. See, e.g., State v. Wieners, 66 Mo. 13, 16 (1877) (ribs and verte-
brae); Turner v. State, 15 S.W. 838, 842 (Tenn. 1891) (vertebral column of victim). In the
trial of Lizzie Borden, her father's skull was brought in for the wounds to be matched with
the hatchet blade found in the basement. See EDMUND PEARSON, THE TRIAL OF LIZZIE
BORDEN 224 (1937). It still occasionally happens. See United States v. Redmond, 21 M.J.
319, 326 (C.M.A. 1986) (skull); State v. Walker, 675 P.2d 1310, 1314 (Ariz. 1984) (piece of
charred skin of arson victim).
45. See Fortune, supra note 23, at 113-14. See generally Imwinkelreid, supra note 10.
46. The distinction between ultimate and mediate facts is not always crystal clear.
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are not recurring instances of mediate admissions which ought to be
just as obligatory as elemental admissions. However, elemental
admissions formally remove the problem of reasoning from the con-
tents of the judicial admission to some other conclusion, and are po-
tentially subject to clear categorical admission. They may be good
candidates for fair judicial admission as a result. However, some
elemental admissions are much more clearly understandable as iso-
lated propositions unrelated to the rest of the case, and more cleanly
removed from claims of acceptable spillover meaning, rational or ir-
rational, on other issues in the case. The clearest case of complete
separability, as we shall see, is a predicate felon element, such as the
one in Old Chief.
First, however, we must examine one extreme circumstance
where the matter admitted is neither mediate nor elemental, and
therefore escapes the possibility of any argument of proper spillover
effect, whereas the evidence to be excluded is subject to that long-
standing categorical rule of exclusion, the propensity rule. Hence,
rejection of a proffered judicial admission in this situation has an
Motive is not an ultimate issue, but it is a recurring, almost protean, justification for the
introduction of otherwise inadmissible and devastating uncharged misconduct evidence.
The reason it is not a good candidate for a judicial admission of obligatory effect, how-
ever, is not because it is mediate, but because it is an issue which varies in legitimate ra-
tional impact depending, not on presence or absence, but on magnitude judgment. It is
not an on-off switch, but a rheostat. All such magnitude judgment conditions present un-
likely grounds for any fairly formulated judicial admission, and many of the cases reject-
ing proffered admissions in both civil and criminal contexts can be accounted for in that
way. See, e.g., Dunning v. Maine Cent. R.R. Co., 39 A. 352 (Me. 1897), analyzed in For-
tune, supra note 23, at 103. Sometimes, courts have become confused enough to allow a
litigant to get away with such a ploy. See, e.g., Griffith v. State, 169 S.W.2d 173, 174 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1943) (allowing prosecutors to avoid proper magnitude evidence by admitting
defendant's good character); Davis v. State, 290 S.W. 163, 163-64 (Tex. Crim. App. 1927)
(same): Bowlin v. State, 248 S.W. 396, 401 (Tex. Crim. App. 1923) (same); State v.
Douglas, 78 A.2d 850, 853 (R.I. 1951) (defense expert qualification). Indeed. related
problems may arise even if the admissions involve elements. See United States v. Ortiz,
125 F.3d 630, 632 (8th Cir. 1997) (defendant in a prosecution for making false statement
of material fact sought to admit all elements except materiality, in order to foreclose
proof of the circumstances on which the magnitude judgment of materiality turned).
47. The particular identity (name, etc.) of a murder victim may technically be a me-
diate fact, but it is subject to a fair categorical admission. (Such particular identification
may be raised to the functional equivalent of an ultimate issue under some versions of the
fatal variance doctrine.) Such particular identification is often said to justify admission of
otherwise inflammatory evidence. See, e.g., State v. Edwards, 10 S.E.2d 587, 588 (S.C.
1940). Justice O'Connor uses it as a justifying example in her dissent in Old Chief. 117 S.
Ct. at 657.
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even smaller formal figleaf to cover its nakedness than exists in the
case of a crime with the status element of "convicted felon," much
less other contexts. Let us start from this clearest example and build
from there.
Most, if not all, American jurisdictions have statutes imposing
stiffer penalties upon those previously convicted of some crimes than
upon first offenders.' Such statutes have been a part of our criminal
jurisprudence for nearly 200 years, at least,49 and are justified because
they are conceived merely to enhance the punishment of the newly
committed crime, which is nonetheless a crime for any actor, felon or
not." As such, it is axiomatic that the predicate felon status is not an
element of the charged crime. Nevertheless, in some jurisdictions,
the sentence enhancing fact of convicted felon status is not only
charged in the indictment, it is submitted to the jury at the same time
as the evidence of the crime charged, complete with evidence con-
cerning the existence and nature of the previous felonies inadmissible
on any issue in the crime charged. In such a case, the right of the de-
fendant to admit felon status and keep the jury trying his guilt from
even being informed of this status seems virtually beyond argument.
An admission of felon status within the meaning of the applicable
statute is easy to formulate and understand. And, in these cases, one
cannot even argue that there is an enhanced risk of jury nullification,
if the trial jury is uninformed of the status of the defendant, much less
the details of the predicate felonies, since the acts charged are crimi-
nal regardless of the defendant's predicate felon status. The unneces-
sary unfairness of allowing proof of felon status in this kind of case
has been widely recognized for nearly a century and a half5" and was
rejected in England by statute in 1861.2 Most American jurisdictions
adopted some procedure for insuring that the jury trying the new of-
48. See generally 24 C.J.S., Criminal Law § 1638 et seq. (1989).
49. The earliest example I have come up with is Mass. Stat. 1804, ch. 143, § 3, cited in
Ross's Case, 2 Mass. (1 Pick.) 165, 170 (Mass. 1824).
50. The Supreme Court has long accepted the characterization of such statutes set
out in the text, and upheld such statutes against constitutional challenge. See Graham v.
West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 631 (1912); McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 313
(1901); Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673,676-78 (1895).
51. See generally Harold Dubroff, Note, The Pleading and Proof of Prior Convictions
in Habitual Criminal Prosecutions, 33 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210 (1958); David S. Sidikman,
Note, Recidivist Procedures, 40 N.Y.U. L. REV. 332 (1965). For an example of the ex-
cesses to which attempted justification of the practice may lead see People v. Neaton, 292
N.W. 589 (Mich. 1940).
52. See Coinage Offences Act, 1861,24 & 25 Vict., ch. 99, § 37.
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fense is never apprised of the previous offense, at least when its exis-
tence is uncontested. 3 Nevertheless, the United States Supreme
Court ruled in 1967, in Spencer v. Texas,54 that states are free to allow
proof of felon status before the jury at the same time guilt is deter-
mined, at least in situations where the jury is given some discretion-
ary sentencing function,55even when the existence of the predicate
felony is uncontested. The rationale of Justice Harlan's opinion for
the majority acknowledges that there was no legitimate probative jus-
tification for the introduction of the prior convictions,56 and no ap-
parent good reason to allow their introduction along with the evi-
dence on guilt - except the minor increase in procedural efficiency
entailed in a one-stage process (guilt and sentence determined to-
gether), as opposed to a two-stage (or bifurcated) process. 7 Fur-
thermore, the danger of using the predicate felon proof as a basis for
conviction of the new crime charged was not inconsiderable." Never-
theless, the Court was not prepared to say that limiting instructions
were not so sufficiently effective that the desirability of the minor ef-
ficiency gain should not be left up to the states under the Constitu-
tion: 9 The claim that states who adopt this odious procedure are mo-
53. See Sidikman, supra note 51, at 333.
54. 385 U.S. 554 (1967).
55. If the jury had no sentencing role, then no "two-step" process would have been
necessary, at least where the defendant admitted his convicted felon status, since the
court could proceed to sentence him accordingly after conviction of the underlying of-
fense.
56. See Spencer, 385 U.S. at 562-63 ("We recognize that the use of prior-crime evi-
dence in a one-stage recidivist trial may be thought to represent a less cogent state inter-
est than does its use for other purposes ... .
57. See id. at 564-65.
58. See id. at 562 ("This type of prejudicial effect is acknowledged to inhere in crimi-
nal practice .... ).
59. Justice Harlan seems to fear that if the universal solvent effect of limiting in-
structions is diluted by ruling them insufficient in this context, it will undermine their ac-
ceptability in areas where reliance on them is more justifiable (i.e., where there is no way
to get the legitimate probative value of the evidence without the potential for spillover
prejudicial effect). "To say the United States Constitution is infringed simply because
this type of evidence may be prejudicial and limiting instructions inadequate to vitiate
prejudicial effects, would make inroads into this entire complex code of state criminal
evidentiary law. and would threaten other large areas of trial jurisprudence." Id. Spencer
was decided before Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123. 137 (1968). which found limiting
instructions to be insufficient protection in regard to confessions admissible against one
co-defendant and not the other. The Bruton situation is very close to one of the examples
Justice Harlan gave as an untoward effect of eroding the useful fiction of limiting instruc-
tions' universal solvent effect.
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tivated by efficiency considerations seems questionable, especially
when coupled with the assertions about the presumed effectiveness of
jury instructions. Perhaps if the Court were to revisit the issue, the
mass of intervening social science research indicating the limited ef-
fectiveness of such instruction might sway it,6° but given the 5-4 deci-
sion in Old Chief, it seems unlikely.61 It should be noted that two of
the three cases before the Supreme Court in Spencer v. Texas in-
volved proffered judicial admissions which were rejected by the
prosecution and the court in favor of proof before the jury. Notably,
the entire Supreme Court - majority, concurrence, and dissent alike -
asserted that, were the decision up to them on a legislative basis, they
would adopt a two-stage procedure.62
Next in clarity is the situation presented by Old Chief itself: the
crime with the predicate felon element. This situation is the func-
tional equivalent of the sentencing enhancement situation, with one
important difference. The actus reus conduct established by the evi-
dence in this case would not be criminal for a non-felon, and if the
jury is not informed that something special makes this a crime for this
defendant when it would not be a crime for the jurors, it is not unrea-
sonable to fear that the jurors may become confused, or refuse to
convict for nullification reasons. This is very clearly illustrated by the
facts of Old Chief itself, since Montana had no restrictions on the
possession or open carrying of any firearm.Y A Montana jury, faced
with a federal statute which appeared to outlaw weapon possession
generally, might very well acquit on nullification grounds. Arguably,
the government has a right to be protected against such a result. 
6
60. See Jonathan D. Casper & Kennette M. Benedict, The Influence of Outcome In-
formation and Attitudes on Juror Decision Making in Search and Seizure Cases, in INSIDE
THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 65 (Reid Hastie ed.,
1993); Kerri L. Pickel, Inducing Jurors to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A Legal Ex-
planation Does Not Help, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 407 (1995); Roselle L. Wissler & Mi-
chael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Convic-
tion Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 37 (1985).
61. The dissent in Old Chief relies in part on the strongly (if not rationally) presumed
efficacy of limiting instructions. See Old Chief v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 644, 658 (1997)
(O'Conner, J., dissenting).
62. See Spencer, 385 U.S. at 567-68 (majority), 569 (concurrence). Old Chief can be
seen in part as a kind of institutional delivery on this promise, at least by the five mem-
bers of the majority.
63. See KESSINGER, supra note 41, at 69.
64. This notion can quickly be extended beyond reason. Thus, the prosecution might
argue that, because nullification is a legal possibility in any case, it ought to be allowed to
counter that possibility with otherwise inadmissible information in every case. Surely
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Accepting this, the question becomes whether or not a general in-
struction to the effect that "the defendant has stipulated that it was
illegal for him to possess a firearm" is sufficient to protect the gov-
ernment without revealing even the general prior felon status of the
defendant to the jury. This is not only debatable; it has been debated
with varying results. Minnesota, for instance, accepts this form of
charge as sufficient to protect the government's legitimate interest. :
Alaska explicitly rejects it,6 and California accepted it until forced to
abandon the practice by a clause in a 1982 initiative measure, the fa-
mous Proposition 8.67 For our purposes, it is necessary to keep in
mind that this was not what was at stake in Old Chief, since Old Chief
was willing for the jury to be told that he was a convicted felon within
the meaning of the statute, as long as nothing concerning the par-
ticular felony was revealed.
Next, we must expand from the context of formal predicate felon
charges to status elements in general, such as the pornographic na-
ture of materials or the imported status of objects. By simple exten-
sion of the predicate felon arguments, such status admissions ought
generally to work to prevent proof of the status by otherwise prejudi-
cial evidence. Once again, however, the cases indicate that when the
other proof raises propensity issues, the admission may work, but
when it raises issues of general outrage, it will not.'
there must be some serious particular and substantial reason to fear nullification before
such arguments can even be considered.
65. See State v. Davidson, 351 N.W.2d 8, 12 (Minn. 1984).
66. See State v. McLaughlin, 860 P.2d 1270, 1277 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993). The only
issue was whether the minimal instruction, or something more referring to felony convic-
tion, was to be given. The court was at pains to say that when a defendant concedes his
status as a convicted felon, evidence of that concession, "unembellished, will normally be
all that is necessary to allow the state to prove this element of the offense.- Id. at 1278
n.15.
67. The California courts had adopted this approach to felon-in-possession offenses,
see People v. Hall, 616 P.2d 826, 832 (Cal. 1980), which appears to have been the main
impetus behind the last line of the so-called "truth in evidence" provisions of the initia-
tive-driven 1982 Victims Bill of Rights, Proposition 8: "When a prior felony conviction is
an element of any felony offense, it shall be proven to the trier of fact in open court."
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(f) (West 1983). The fairly complex details of how the California
courts have dealt with this language is mercifully beyond the scope of this article. See
generally Jeff Brown, Proposition 8: Origins and Impact-A Public Defender's Perspec-
tive, 23 PAC. L. J. 881, 903-06 (1992).
68. Compare Parr v. United States, 255 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1958) (the wellspring fed-
eral "offer to stipulate" case cited, apparently with approval, by the majority in Old Chief
v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 644, 653 (1997)), and United States v. Gantzer, 810 F.2d 349
(2d Cir. 1987) (allowing the prosecution to submit alleged pornography to the jury over
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We now move beyond status elements to the situation presented
by what might be called normal crimes. As it turns out, Molineux-
type cases aside, the potential usefulness of a judicial admission in the
normal crime setting to eliminate otherwise admissible uncharged
misconduct evidence is much smaller in practice than one might at
first imagine. In the normal criminal context, as previously noted,
there are generally three classes of elements which might potentially
be subject to admission: actus reus, mens rea, and identity of the de-
fendant as the actor. In his superb and near definitive treatise on the
subject, Professor Imwinkelried has outlined the many non-
propensity inferential connection arguments which can and are used
by prosecutors to argue for admissibility of uncharged misconduct,
and which are regularly invoked by courts to justify its admission.69
Further, he has collected and analyzed these arguments by the type
of ultimate issue to which each argument is properly directed. Ex-
cept in the Molineux situation (uncharged misconduct offered on the
pretext of proving uncontested and practically incontestable presence
of intent or lack of accident or mistake), rationales which are avail-
able to argue relevance to either actus reus or mens rea are also
available to argue relevance to identification. Hence, there is little
room to exclude anything by, for instance, admitting the actus reus
and the mens rea in a case where the only practical issue is that
someone else committed the crime. There is a lot of intellectually
dishonest nonsense in the administration of the propensity rule to be
sure, but it is not usually the kind that can effectively be exposed or
cured through a judicial admission by the defendant. A court which
will improperly declare pure propensity evidence relevant through
some pretextual rationale will have little difficulty in declaring it
equally relevant to any unadmitted element, such as identity,0 leav-
ing a guilty plea as the only effective admission. The upshot is that a
general acceptance of the propriety of the judicial admission mecha-
admissions by the defendants (who claimed non-involvement) that the material was le-
gally pornographic), with United States v. Durkan, 539 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1976) (finding it
error, in a smuggling case, to allow the prosecution to prove the admitted imported status
of the goods by proving that the defendant stole them in Canada).
69. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 11, §§ 3:01-5:37.
70. See, e.g., State v. Friedrich, 398 N.W.2d 763 (Wis. 1987) and the numerous other
cases collected in IMWINKELRIED, supra note 11, § 3:24 under the rubric "spurious plan,"
by which many courts regularly admit uncharged misconduct evidence on little more than
the claim that it makes out a life plan to commit that type of crime. One would think that
this was the very definition of propensity.
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nism would not threaten the normal admissibility of virtually all oth-
erwise admissible uncharged misconduct evidence, (at least in juris-
dictions already following the Molineux principle), nor help cure the
considerable ills of this miasmic 
The existence of Molineux-type cases shows that there is at least
71. This is the place to dispel the notion that Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991).
has anything to do with judicial admissions. The prominent reliance on an isolated line
from Chief Justice Rhenquist's opinion in Estelle by the Old Chief dissent might lead one
to believe that it was at the very least the Powell v. Texas of Molineutx-type cases. The
line is, "the prosecution's burden to prove every element of the crime is not relieved by a
defendant's tactical decision not to contest an essential element of the offense." Estelle,
502 U.S. at 69. When cited the first time in the Old Chief dissent, it is cited for the propo-
sition that "a defendant's tactical decision not to contest an essential element of the crime
does not remove the prosecution's burden to prove that element." 117 S. Ct. at 659
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Fair enough the first time, but here, context is everything.
McGuire was charged with the murder of his infant daughter, who died of injuries consis-
tent with a brutal beating, including multiple deep bruises and internal organ damage.
See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 65. McGuire originally told his wife that the baby must have fallen
off the couch. See id. at 65-66. Examination of the child's body revealed many healed
wounds (including evidence of anal tearing). See id. at 65. This was admitted through a
physician who testified to "battered child syndrome." Id. at 68 (The dependability of that
testimony beyond the actual evidence of the existence of extensive healed injuries was not
before the Court.). At trial, McGuire took no formal position at all. While he did not
formally raise the notion of accident, the condition of the child was not such that her im-
mediate injuries might not have been the result of some accident (although "falling off the
couch" was highly unlikely). In order to remove this possible alternative non-criminal
explanation from the jurors' minds, the State, quite properly, was allowed to tender the
evidence of the extensive old injuries. See id. at 69. Note that this is not at all like Mo-
lineux, where the untenability of accident was manifest from the circumstances of the
case. Note also that the defense neither explicitly, nor practically, admitted that the child
had died of intentionally inflicted wounds, nor could it, for such an admission would mean
to a virtual certainty that either the mother, McGuire, or both killed the child; the evi-
dence rendered it virtually certain that no one else had access to the child at the time of
her injury. (McGuire's pretrial assertion that "some Mexicans come in," id. at 65, like the
fall from the couch, was not presented by him at trial.) Such admission would leave sub-
stantially less room for defensive argument in court, or in the jury room. McGuire's
"'failure to contest" was essentially his standing mute, and if this affected either the right
or the obligation of the prosecution to present evidence, no prosecution could even start if
the defendant elected to stand mute. It is in this context, and only this context, that the
quoted line was generated. Nevertheless, notice how it is shifted to stand for the proposi-
tion that "the defendant's strategic decision to 'agree' that the Government need not
prove an element cannot relieve the Government of its burden" when it is cited the sec-
ond time in the Old Chief dissent. 117 S. Ct. at 659 (O'Connor, J.. dissenting). Nonsense.
Essentially, all that Estelle v. McGuire decides is that when the Molineux rationale does
not apply in fact, and there is no formal admission, the State is free to introduce evidence
to show the absence of accident or mistake, relying only on limiting instructions to dispel
any prejudice. This result is hardly surprising (or pertinent).
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limited scope for proper use of judicial admissions in the propensity
evidence area which courts may be willing to honor. "Heartstrings
and gore" evidence presents an entirely different picture, which
brings us closer to the theme of this symposium. For there are lots of
cases in which judicial admissions can be fashioned fairly to give the
prosecution all the benefit to which it is rationally entitled, which
render proffered "heartstrings and gore" evidence formally irrele-
vant. The cases are nearly uniform in result: the prosecution is free
to choose to prove the uncontested facts with its "heartstrings and
gore" evidence, even in the face of an admission which clearly estab-
lishes, for the case and the jury, the only things that supposedly jus-
tify the admission of the prosecution's evidence in the first place." A
72. An extensive collection of both state and federal heartstrings and gore cases is
found in the 1997 supplement to 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM,
JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 5213-22 (Supp. 1997). It contains annota-
tions on nearly 200 cases involving such evidence since 1977. This is, of course, not com-
plete, nor does it claim to be. For instance, there are now over 3,000 people on death row
in the United States. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1997 222, no. 360 (117 ed. 1997) (As
of December 21, 1995, the number was 3,054 and rising by approximately 140 per year
since 1990.) Many of their appeals raise the issue, where it was obviously rejected. Nev-
ertheless, the Wright & Graham material is a sufficient base to confirm what everyone
already knows. Further, it is unlikely to under-represent cases which found error in ad-
mitting heartstrings and gore evidence, with or without formal admissions, since those are
unusual enough to be seized on for inclusion when encountered. In only ten cases in that
compilation did such evidence contribute to the reversal of convictions, and there were
generally other sufficient grounds present as well. Further, three of those cases were
from one jurisdiction (Oklahoma) on the narrow issue of victim-in-life photos. By no
means were all of the rest erroneously decided. Many undoubtedly involved evidence
which offered information actually relevant to some contested issue which could not be as
completely presented and apprehended from any other source. However, a significant
percentage offered no information on any disputed issue, and one doubts that these ten
reversals in twenty years, usually including other sufficient grounds for reversal, were
enough to properly discipline the American criminal courtroom. In one reversal from
Arizona, the prosecution introduced a piece of charred skin from an arson victim suppos-
edly to show the extent of the burning. See State v. Walker, 675 P.2d 1310 (Ariz. 1984).
Extreme as it is, it is not much worse than other practices routinely found acceptable in
Arizona courts. See, e.g., State v. Grilz, 666 P.2d 1059 (Ariz. 1983) (insanity plea, victim's
identity, and all details of murder uncontested; no error to admit victim's hysterical 911
call to establish "time frame," and multiple horrific crime scene photos). In an Oklahoma
reversal, the prosecution supplemented photos of a decaying corpse with verbal descrip-
tions of the smell of rotting flesh and the sound of maggots chewing. See Tobler v. State,
688 P.2d 350 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984). Again, not that much worse than the evidence
routinely accepted. See, e.g., Howe v. State, 669 P.2d 780 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984) (photo
of victim's body crawling with maggots admissible to corroborate testimony of place
where victim was found). Oklahoma does deserve a star for being the only jurisdiction
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single example will suffice for now: the prosecution is routinely al-
lowed to introduce horrific crime scene photos in cases where the
photos offer no definable information on the identity of the perpetra-
tor, and where the only stated rationale is to prove the fact of death,
its commission by another, or the intentionality of the act of killing,
in the face of unqualified defense admissions of these facts. Courts
may assuage their consciences on occasion by excluding a portion of
the multiple photos proffered, or some other such solomonic act, but
with a general rule against victim-in-life photos (usually in prom gowns, graduation robes.
or uniforms). See Binsz v. State, 675 P.2d 448 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984): Smith v. State,
650 P.2d 904 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982); Boutwell v. State, 659 P.2d 322 (Okla Crim. App.
1983) (observing that a rule was necessary because the practice was near universal).
Other jurisdictions are apparently untroubled by the practice. See, e.g., United States v.
Grandison, 780 F.2d 425 (4th. Cir. 1985) (harmless error); State v. Bockman, 682 P.2d 925
(Wash. Ct. App. 1984). The Washington Supreme Court, in affirming a case in which the
prosecutor put in five photos of a decapitated murder victim, hinted that if prosecutors
did not show more restraint the court might do something about it. See State v. Cren-
shaw, 659 P.2d 488, 498 (Wash. 1983). There was thereafter one reversal by the Washing-
ton Court of Appeals for the admission of unnecessary gruesome crime scene photos, see
State v. Sargeant, 698 P.2d 598 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985), but subsequently it was business as
usual, see State v. Kendrick, 736 P.2d 1079 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (finding photos of mu-
tilated murder victims with objects protruding from their heads were no more gruesome
than the crime and were properly admitted). In a murder case, a Michigan court found
error (somewhat surprisingly) in the admission of a police radio tape of a transmission
from the officer victim reporting that he had been shot. See People v. O'Brien, 317
N.W.2d 570 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982). Finally, there was a reversal in a California identity
case based on the uncontested nature of the issues to which the photos were supposedly
relevant. See People v. Boyd, 95 Cal. App. 3d 577 (1979). This is an island in a sea of
contrary rulings. See, e.g., People v. Lynn, 159 Cal. App. 3d 715 (1984) (finding photo of
deceased with cord tied around neck and tongue protruding relevant to motive). Mon-
tana has an inconsistent appellate policy of trying to curtail prosecutorial abuse. Compare
State v. Allies, 606 P.2d 1043 (Mont. 1980), and State v. Pendergrass, 586 P.2d 691 (Mont.
1978) (not cited by Graham), with State v. McKenzie, 581 P.2d 1205 (Mont. 1978), and
State v. Austad, 641 P.2d 1373 (Mont. 1982). Beyond this, Professor Tanford cited studies
that found no reversals involving bloody photos for periods of twenty-five and eleven
years, respectively. See J. Alexander Tanford, A Political-choice Approach to Limiting
Prejudicial Evidence, 64 IND. L.J. 831, 843 n.80 (1989), and authorities cited therein. For
a look at how Indiana trial judges evaluated such evidence 30 years ago, see Thomas L.
Shaffer, Judges, Repulsive Evidence and the Ability to Respond, 43 NOTRE DAME LAW.
503 (1967-68).
Nor, as noted in the text, do explicit admissions help. See United States v. Gantzer.
810 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1987); State v. Garcia, 664 P.2d 1343 (Kan. 1983): State v. Crump.
654 P.2d 922 (Kan. 1982); State v. Muetze, 368 N.W.2d 575 (S.D. 1985): see also Parr v.
United States , 255 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1958) (discussed supra. note 68): State v. Leland, 227
P.2d 785 (Or. 1951) (discussed infra, note 88). In most jurisdictions a judge has a better
chance of being killed by lightning than of being reversed for failing to control prosecuto-
rial abuse of heartstrings and gore.
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they virtually never exclude completely. What does this say about
the truth we are searching for?
The Relevance of the Irrelevant
The judicial admission mechanism raises one of a cluster of re-
lated questions concerning the judicial system's tolerance for, and af-
firmative fostering of, presentation of evidence Which is information-
ally irrelevant to the legally material issues of the case in any
meaningful or tenable sense. When I initially sat down to write this
section, the literature seemed fairly uniform in noticing the protean
phenomenon of such irrelevant evidence out of the corner of its eye,
and then passing quickly over it by reference to such unhelpful labels
as "background"'73 or "res gestae."'74 The dominant response ap-
peared to be that if such information turned out to be irrelevant, it
was usually just because a certain level of irrelevant noise in testimo-
nial expression and other evidence presentation was inevitable,
harmless, and not worth the time or effort of trying to suppress it.
75
My own response was there was a lot more noise with a lot more pur-
pose than generally recognized. 76 In what follows, I propose to ex-
amine a phenomenon which might help shed light on some usually
unexamined deep background assumptions of our proof process.
This may in turn help us to account in part for the surprising failure
of judicial admissions (or anything else) to control the prosecution's
resort to "heartstrings and gore" evidence in criminal cases.
For many years, I have presented evidence students with this
puzzle: Why is the prosecution in a case charging simple possession of
heroin' always allowed to display to the jury the typical glassine or
plastic bag filled with white powder? In one sense, the answer ap-
pears to be easy. If a person is charged with possessing a contraband
substance, what could be more centrally "relevant" than the very
substance itself which the person is charged with possessing? Yet on
73. See FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee's note.
74. See 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 365 (3d ed. 1940).
75. See FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee's note.
76. As I wrote this section, I received a reprint of the new article, David Crump, On
the Uses of Irrelevant Evidence, 34 Hous. L. REV. 1 (1997). While I may not totally agree
with every aspect of Professor Crump's article, his analysis of witness examination and
the rhetorical and emotional uses of irrelevancy has at last moved that subject from the
twilight of practitioner lore to the spotlight of academic examination.
77. I have chosen the charge of simple possession to eliminate arguments that per-
ception of volume is relevant to an inference of intent to distribute.
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closer examination, this response seems unsatisfactory. Things have
not yet come to the point that the average jury can be assumed by
general life experience to be capable of concluding accurately by di-
rect perception that the powder in a plastic bag is heroin instead of
flour or some other benign substance. Even if we were to assume
that a jury could so tell, the normal way in which such exhibits are
handled in courtrooms would preclude the jury from getting this in-
formation itself, since the bags are never sent into the jury room to be
tasted, inhaled, or injected in an exercise of direct jury fact-finding.
Hence, we can neither rationally assume jury competence from aver-
age general experience to determine if the substance is heroin, nor do
we conduct the trial in such a way as to allow such competence as the
jury may possess to come into play. Yet without both these condi-
tions, the bags of powder are in the most important sense, irrelevant,
since the bags offer no information rationally useable by the jury to
resolve any factual issue made material by the applicable substantive
law. Yet their display is always allowed, and the bags themselves are
routinely given exhibit numbers and "admitted into evidence." Why?
The answer may begin to become clearer if we distinguish be-
tween two kinds of relevance, one of which we will call potential
relevance, and the other working,78 or actual relevance. Potential
relevance exists when a proffered piece of evidence is reasonably
taken to be a repository of relevant information about a material is-
sue of fact. Working relevance exists only when that potential infor-
mation is also rationally useable by application of the reasoning skills
and general background knowledge fairly attributable to the average
juror, either directly or with the mediation of a dependable expert
translator of some kind. Indeed, perhaps the clearest example of the
distinction involves language translation. Suppose a visitor from the
central Asian steppes, who speaks only an obscure Turkic dialect, ob-
serves an assault. We have every reason to believe that the sounds
coming from the witness's mouth encode much important informa-
tion. The information encoded in the sounds is undoubtedly relevant
(potentially). However, no one would think it made much sense to
allow the witness to sit in front of a jury and emit those sounds if no
person were available who could dependably translate them into
English, and thus dependably render the potential relevance into
working relevance.
Although the black letter of our common rule definitions of
78. I was tempted to call this kinetic relevance, but fortunately thought better of it.
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relevance fail to account for this distinction,'9 it seems obvious, at
least initially, that the only kind of relevance that ought to result in
admission for use by a factfinder is actual working relevance, ren-
dering the evidence rationally useable by that factfinder.' Indeed,
this sounds tautological, though it isn't quite, and in fact we routinely
allow the display of evidence which possesses only potential rele-
vance, if that. This curious situation may arise in regard to testimo-
nial detail, but its most puzzling aspects are best illustrated by corpo-
real exhibits which are in some sense "relics" of the actual event
which gave rise to the controversy being tried, such as the heroin
bags.
The rational limits of potential relevance are not clear and are
certainly not limited by any current state of art in transforming po-
tential relevance into working relevance. Assume a paternity suit.
The baby has traditionally been felt to be "relevant," certainly be-
yond the rationally demonstrable powers of a factfinder to assign
parentage accurately by direct observation. There appears always to
have been a strong intuition that the baby was a repository of central
and telling information, though only now has science developed
techniques to render that information dependably usable with any
specificity in the usual case. Nevertheless, the baby was often the
subject of display based on the intuition of potential relevance, and
the hope that something good might come from staring at it."' This
79. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 401, which declares evidence relevant if it has "any ten-
dency to make the existence of a fact more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence," without suggesting a referent to the trier of fact's rational capacities to derive
or process the information. It emphasizes the content of the code independent of the
characteristics of the decoder. Rule 403 does not provide an appropriate framework to
deal with this problem either, since it assumes some probative value must be present to
get past rules 401 and 402. Professor Leonard, for different but perhaps related reasons,
has recently proposed a version of Rule 401 which would solve the problem. See David P.
Leonard, Comment, Minimal Probative Value and the Failure of Good Sense, 34 Hous. L.
REV. 89, 96 (1997).
80. For an excellent discussion which attempts to deal with the knowledge and abili-
ties of the factfinder within the terms of Rule 401, see WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note
10, § 5165 at 56-59, § 5173 at 129-31. I wrote the text without reference to these sections,
but I read them when they first appeared, and have obviously been heavily influenced by
them more than I was in conscious memory aware, and for that I thank Professor Graham
(the laboring oar to Professor Wright's helmsman), and also Professor Wright.
81. Baby display presents a somewhat problematic example, since its rationality vel
non is likely to be fact sensitive and case specific. Nevertheless, if my own experience
with elderly aunts is any indication, people commonly claim clinical abilities to see par-
ent-child resemblances ("she has her father's eyes") about which substantial skepticism is
Jan.1998]
intuition quickly grades off into mystical belief in the power of relics
(if only that little knife could talk, the story it would tell). No doubt
relics possess emotional power, which is why the Windsor chair sat
upon by John Hancock when he signed the Declaration of Independ-
ence is worth a hundred times as much as its virtually indistinguish-
able mate from the next room.
Be this as it may, it seems clear that the operational standard of
"relevance" for such relics is different than for any other evidence)'2
All that is necessary is potential relevance of the most unformed
sort." This is as true for the knife found near a crime scene which is
"consistent with" being the murder weapon but offers no useful in-
formation itself on any issue of material fact even with the aid of ex-
pert testimony, as it is for the heroin bags whose contents will be the
subject of expert testimony. And in the latter case, we should keep in
mind that normally all of the rationally useful information about the
bag and its contents comes from testimony concerning the time and
place dimensions applicable to the bag in the past, and tests done
outside the presence of the jury. Virtually none comes from the ju-
justified. This seems to be a very widespread social convention. The so-called "settled
features" rule can be seen as an attempt to place some limits on this, derived from per-
ceived defects in the ability of humans to accurately process the information present.
However, as a broad categorical rule, "settled features" is itself subject to the criticism
that it will let in as much unprocessable as processable information, and that the act of
admission will invite, if not compel. the jurors to believe they have, and are expected to
have, capacities they do not possess. See generally cases collected and analyzed in JACK
B. WEINSTEIN, ETAL., EVIDENCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 100-03 (9th ed. 1997).
82. It hardly needs citation that the prosecution gets to display the original heroin
bags, but if they lose them, they cannot simply substitute identical prop bags. Replica
evidence generally requires much more specific authentication to establish dimensions of
rationally useable relevance. See Young v. Price, 442 P.2d 67 (Haw. 1968). Some cases
come close to the line, however. One court allowed display of an axe based solely on the
recognition testimony of the victim that he was "pretty sure" the axe was the one used
against him. See United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224. 1247 (9th Cir. 1980). In an-
other case, a civil rights action for wrongful shooting of an inmate, the defendant testified
that the plaintiff had attacked him with a shank (a homemade knife). See Davis v. Lane.
814 F.2d 397. 398 (7th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff denied the attack or that he had ever had a
shank. See id. at 399. The shank allegedly used in the attack could not be found, and the
court allowed the introduction of another shank to show what such weapons look like. as
bearing on the reasonableness to responding to an attack with such a weapon by shooting.
See id. Similar considerations probably explain why judges sometimes more easily ex-
clude autopsy photographs than more gruesome crime scene photos. See Shaffer. supra
note 72, at 505-08.
83. Professor Graham tends to blame Wigmore's rather unsophisticated treatment of
"autoptic proference" for this state of affairs. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM. supra note 10.
§ 5173. at 128-29.
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rors' perception of the bags in the courtroom.84
Because of this different operational standard of relevance, we
allow the proponent lucky enough to be blessed with such relics to
display" them to the jury, complete with exhibit stamps and the
judge's imprimatur, even when they are essentially props which add
no rational information for the jury's consideration. And the gusto
with which attorneys take advantage of this opportunity suggests that
attorneys see advantages in the process, advantages not justifiable, at
least in any obvious way, in terms of fostering rational fact recon-
struction, and more easily related to the parable of the brick. Again
the question: Why do we allow this?"
84. In this regard much relic display is like the parable of the brick:
"My grandfather was a wonderful man, and he had a wonderful cow.
That cow could jump like no other cow. One night she jumped over the
moon, which upset the man in the moon so much that he knocked her
flying, and she fell back to earth and fell on my grandfather's house and
broke his chimney to pieces, and I can prove that every word I say is
true, because here's a brick from that very chimney."
Now I suppose that one could say some information comes from the brick, since if
the speaker then produced a potato, it would destroy whatever corroborative effect is de-
rived from the brick, but in themselves, bricks (and plastic bags and white powder) are so
commonly obtainable that it is fair to say that virtually all the information comes from the
testimony and none from the exhibit. A brick is not a wall, but sometimes it's not even a
brick.
85. See supra note 84.
86. The closest anyone has come to addressing this in detail is Professor Graham. In
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5165, at 62-63, he introduces a concept he calls
"psychological relevance." (He attributes the concept to the philosopher William Frank-
ena, but while Frankena coined the term, he himself was rather contemptuously dismis-
sive of resort to evidence with only "psychological" relevance:
As a philosopher, whether as moralist or as logician, I cannot but de-
cry this. In any case, however, I am going to deal only with logical
relevance. What is psychologically relevant is something one can
learn from experience, from older lawyers, from social psychologists,
or from some legal Dale Carnegie's book on how to make friends and
influence juries-not from philosophers.
William Frankena, The Basic Theory of Relevancy, 35 MICH. ST. B.J., July 1956, at 12, 13.
Professor Graham is not so dismissive.) Graham defines it as "relevance based upon in-
tuition and other forms of intelligence centered in the right lobe of the brain, as distin-
guished from the highly verbalized forms of logic that are employed by the left lobe," and
he is generally in favor of it, though "it cannot be explained to the satisfaction of those
who reject intuition as a source of knowledge." WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10,
§ 5165, at 62. He further claims that Rule 401 "would permit psychological relevance to
be openly utilized." Id. at 63. Whether Rule 401 permits it or not, nothing has stopped it,
but for myself, I must say that I am deeply skeptical, perhaps having seen "intuition" of-
ten miscarry in the hands of those who claim to have it most. Professor Graham is pre-
One cynical response to this question is that we allow it because,
in spite of the polite civic myth reflected in Rule 102, we don't really
care as much about rationality in the trial process as we like to claim.
Not that rationality is not a value, just not a trump value in the face
of other more atavistic considerations.8Y Such a response is most
likely to come from those who believe that the "judicial combat"
model is the lens that gives the truest picture of the realities of our
trial system, and perhaps the one that reflects ultimately appropriate
valuesY. This school of thought holds that accuracy and rationality
are at best secondary values in the trial process, and that the true
primary value is to give both the parties and the public a stage on
which a fair (though not necessarily rational), dramatic, emotionally
pared for such a response, however: "The concept of 'psychological relevance' will un-
doubtedly be anathema to many judges and lawyers because the legal profession is pre-
dominantly peopled with left-lobe thinkers who like to think that the satisfaction they re-
ceive in the exercise of a merciless logic is not emotional but intellectual." Id. (He must
not have known some of the trial lawyers I have known. However, he properly points out
that intellectual satisfaction is just "a different emotion." Id. at 63 n.82.). Professor Gra-
ham continues: "[T]he determination of relevance has always been as much an emotional
as an intellectual undertaking .... To frankly admit that the judge as well as the jury can
take inarticulate feelings into account in assessing evidence is not to surrender justice to a
salivating mob but to recognize that resolving disputes is a human rather than a mechani-
cal undertaking." Id. at 63. I remain not only unconvinced, but fearful. However. appar-
ently Justice Souter is neither. See infra text accompanying and following note 133.
87. See Professor Leonard's observations on the "Paradigm of Catharsis." David P.
Leonard, The Use of Character to Prove Conduct: Rationality and Catharsis in the Law of
Evidence, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 31-42 (1986-87). See also Duane, supra note 12, at 432-
34.
88. Some can't seem to separate the two paradigms. Consider the following:
The classic view of the trial is that it is a 'search for truth.' In this
view, the adversary system is a contest between equals. The role of
the prosecutor is to obtain a conviction, while the role of the defense
attorney is to obtain an acquittal. If each carries out his role, then the
truth will emerge. The goal of this model is to arrive at an accurate
result. The search for truth model demands that the 'scales must be
evenly held,' so that the parties may be equally armed for adversarial
combat.
Susan Bandes, Taking Some Rights Too Seriously: The State's Right to a Fair Trial, 60 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1037 (1987) (footnotes omitted). See also the observations of the
Oregon Supreme Court in State v. Leland, 227 P.2d 785 (Or. 1951). The defendant admit-
ted the actus reus (murder of a young girl with a knife) and identity, but claimed insanity.
See id. at 788. Nevertheless, in affirming the propriety of allowing in bloody clothing and
other such evidence, the court said that the plea put in formal issue every element of the
case, and that the State was therefore free, regardless of defendant's admissions, to prove
its case "up to the hilt," limited only by "the rules of fair evidence and the standard of fair
play." Id. at 799.
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satisfying, and decisive mock combat can be played out to a conclu-
sion which will lay the underlying controversy to rest by acceptable
catharsis. This contrasts with the official search for truth model re-
flected in Rule 102, with its goal of maximal rational accuracy within
the time constraints of a functional system. We will have occasion to
return to this collision infra.' Whatever the descriptive or explana-
tory validity of the judicial combat model, I personally choose to be-
lieve that there is sufficient honorable respect for the official ideol-
ogy' that departures from it in practice must be justified by time
efficiency considerations which do not take the system too far from
89. I think the reality of our trial system reflects an uncomfortable amalgam of para-
digms and values, neither fully analyzed nor coherent, springing from a collision of the
views and interests of a variety of powerful forces often driven by emotions having little
to do with "rectitude of decision" or delivering the official promise of the legal system. In
addition to the norms reflected by the judicial combat model, we must add the ritual "ex-
orcism of ignorance" when it is too uncomfortable to admit the limits of our rational
knowledge. See D. Michael Risinger, Mark P. Denbeaux, & Michael J. Saks, Exorcism of
Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification
"Expertise," 137 U. PA. L. REv. 731, 781-82 (1989). Additionally, we must consider the
external economic interests and political goals of powerful repeat players in the system,
which, it has been suggested, includes admission or exclusion of evidence for "protection
of the state." See Tanford, supra note 72, at 857-58. See also Kenneth W. Graham, Jr.,
"There'll Always be an England". The Instrumental Ideology of Evidence, 85 MICH. L.
REv. 1204, 1232-34 (1987) (asserting, essentially, that litigation is a political exercise in
which notions of rationality, fairness, and justice are only tools to be used when you can
con the other side (or the system) into letting them help you). Furthermore, we must add
the need to adopt procedures which will satisfy the public that the judgments issued by
the legal system are acceptable, even when such procedures conflict with maximized ac-
curacy. See Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event?: On Judicial Proof and the Ac-
ceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357 (1985). Apropos of the latter dynamic,
Professor Nesson displayed some level of discomfort with accepting the implications of
his observations, see id. at 1391, and most of the examples he gave were rather benign.
The law's response to "heartstrings and gore" in criminal cases, and the more extreme
proposals of the victims' rights movement, see infra note 108, may be seen as showing the
dark side of this idea. Leonard's Paradigm of Catharsis, see Leonard, supra note 87,
combines elements of trial by combat and the need for public acceptability. Finally,
Duane isolates victim dignity as another independent goal which might justify the admis-
sion of some otherwise irrelevant information. See Duane, supra note 12, at 433.
Perhaps someday, by considering all these things together and in the open, we will be
able to work out some coherent hierarchy of trump values. For what might be seen as
beginnings, see generally Tanford, supra note 72, and Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of
Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature of Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence, 58 WASH. L.
REV. 497, 523-30 (1983). However, we certainly have nothing very satisfactory in general
at present. I predict (and hope) that once we go through the process, we will be forced
once again to draw the ultimate trump values from the "rectitude of decision" model.
90. To adopt explicitly an official ideology and then to ignore consciously procedures
which violate it turns the ideology into hypocritical window dressing.
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maximal rationality, or by appeal to some independent substantive
value which will be served by a practice departing from rationality
maximization without leading to an unacceptable increase in inaccu-
rate results. I further choose to believe that any practice that cannot
be so justified will finally be discarded after it is recognized as such.'
For the practice of allowing matter-of-course display of original
relic exhibits not to be discarded, therefore, it must be justifiable be-
cause it arguably does maximize rationality, or because it is so much
more time efficient than other modes of proceeding, or because it
promotes some value independent of rational accuracy which we are
willing to embrace explicitly even at the cost of the marginal increase
in inaccuracy it introduces.
I think that we can begin by discarding the latter justification.
Mere display of the relics of a past event, no matter how interesting
or dramatic, would seem to be an independent value for a wax mu-
seum, but not in itself for a judicial system. Such display does not
appear to promote such a value as personal dignity, or privacy, or the
check on potential abuse of state power, which might justify this prac-
tice in the way that other practices admittedly not designed for opti-
mum rationality are justified.
Similarly, we can discard time efficiency as a justification. It
would be difficult to construct an argument that admitting exhibits
which offer no primary information saves the time of doing anything
else. That leaves us with trying to fashion a convincing argument that
the practice promotes rational accuracy in some way. Interestingly, a
number of such arguments can be made.
1. The "check on cheating" argument. This rationale, or some in-
tuited version of it, probably had a lot to do with the establishment of
the unquestioned process of admitting relics in the era before discov-
ery, when the trial was the primary opportunity for both the fact-
finder and the opponent to examine the case of the moving party.
Allowing, and virtually requiring through the weight of expectation,
the production of such physical relics as one might reasonably con-
clude would exist if the proponent's case were as claimed, does two
things. It allows the opponent to examine the physical residues of the
episode with an eye to rendering their potential relevance actual in a
way which is helpful or exculpatory to the opponent, and it cuts down
the options of one who would fabricate. Fabrication with attendant
props both requires a more abandoned heart, and is more likely to be
91. I also recognize that I may be foolish in choosing to believe as I do.
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exposed either through the details of the false relics themselves, or
because of the breakdown of the wider conspiracy and cooperation
that the fabrication of such relics often necessitates. However, these
functions can be adequately discharged today at the pretrial stage of
every civil case, and in regard to the State's case, in every criminal
prosecution where broad discovery rights have been established in
favor of the criminal defendant. The "check on cheating" argument
is not a very good justification for the matter of course display of
such relics to the jury in today's trial practice.
2. The "two wrongs make a right" argument. This justification
holds that we show the jury relics because they will infer that they
exist, and they are likely to wrongfully infer some nefarious reason
for their failure to be displayed, even if we explain why they are not
displayed, and forbid the opponent from suggesting the propriety of
such an inference in argument. Jurors expect to see such displays for
various reasons, not the least of which is their familiarity with their
routine display in trials from the popular media, and it is just too un-
likely that we can correct for such expectations effectively at this
point in the history of trials.
3. The "it keeps them awake" justification. This argument says
that the jury is inherently interested in relics on a gut level, and their
display keeps the jury's attention on the proceedings so that they may
be open to pick up, remember, and digest the rationally useful infor-
mation which they might otherwise miss because their minds were
dulled or wandering from boredom.'
4. The "it's too hard to figure out" argument. This argument
holds that judges have a justified insecurity about both the propo-
nent's ability and their own to describe explicitly the dimensions of
an original relic proffer which render it actually relevant for direct
jury use. Therefore, they ought to let in any relic for display, unless
there is a strong reason not to, just in case the jurors see something
92. Consider the following:
What is called real evidence-mostly bullets, bad florins, and nailed
boots-is of much value for securing attention.... This is true even
when these exhibits prove nothing-as is generally the case. They
look so solid and important that they give stability to the rest of the
story: and so the French call such things pieces de conviction. The
mind in doubt ever turns to tangible objects.... A rusty knife is now
to an English juryman what a scarabeus was to an Egyptian of old. I
have seen a crooked nail and a broken charity-box treated with all the
reverence due to relics of the holiest martyrs.
CHARLES DARLING, SCINTILLAE JU1RIS 75-76 (6th ed. 1914).
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that hasn't occurred to either the proponent or the judge. This as-
sumption of useable relevance even when we can't identify any seems
to me to go too far, but we will have occasion to return to it in con-
nection with the majority opinion in Old Chief.93
It seems likely that an inchoate intuition of all of these rationales
plays some part in the continued unquestioned acceptance of relic
display. Of these four rationales, the second and third seem to be the
most suggestive in going beyond the initial puzzle of relics with
purely potential relevance to other trial situations, such as the judicial
admission by criminal defendants. If a jury's expectations and inter-
est can justify in-court displays which add no usably relevant informa-
tion, it would seem to suggest some right to dramatic presentation in-
dependent of relevance.94
"Drama" as used here is something of a problem to define. It is
something beyond the right to present relevant information, or the
right to present it coherently and in what the proponent judges to be
the most rationally comprehensive and comprehensible way. Drama
is an irrational phenomenon having to do with the fact that there are
always a variety of ways to present rationally relevant information
coherently, along with a range of supplementary and supporting con-
texts in which it can be presented, and some of these are simply more
emotionally gripping and powerful than others."5 As noted, the func-
93. An interesting example occurred recently in New Jersey in the second double-
murder trial of Josh Pompey (after one hung jury). A bloody windbreaker allegedly worn
by the killer during the murders was introduced into evidence. It contained a tag with
badly soiled and faded printing which experts for both sides testified spelled out the let-
ters "Ymay" or "Yaway." In examining his witness, the prosecutor asked, "doesn't Ya-
way rhyme with Pompey" which the defense used to ridicule the desperation of the prose-
cution in its closing. However, when jurors examined the label during deliberations they
turned it upside down and came to the conclusion that what it really said was "Josh P."
See Christopher Mumma, Jurors Turned One Exhibit on its Head, THE RECORD (Bergen
County, N.J.), March 10, 1998, at L1. Exactly how ink blots that the expert witnesses for
both sides said looked like "Ymay" or "Yaway" could be turned upside down and then
look like "Josh P" remains something of a mystery. See also Professor Graham's argu-
ments regarding "psychological relevance," supra note 86.
94. I here want to thank Mark P. Denbeaux for a year-long dialogue on what he has
always claimed to be an independent "right to drama."
95. Emotions, in all their shades and variety, are value-charged responses, positive or
negative. The role of emotion in rational tasks is easy to underestimate, since without
some emotional response to the task, there would be no reason to spend the effort to do it
at all. There is even some empirical confirmation for this. See DANIEL GOLEMAN.
EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE 52-54 (1995); see also MELVIN J. LERNER, THE BELIEF IN A
JUST WORLD 10 (1980). Nevertheless, at some quickly arrived at point, emotional ma-
nipulation in the adversary process can be seen as turning the jury from the task the law
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tional assumption of our adversary trial process seems to be that
dramatic presentation is not intrinsically evil, and may even be intrin-
sically good. And in keeping with the general party autonomy as-
sumptions of our adversary process, each lawyer is generally free to
choose whichever way of presentation is most dramatically effective
to make a point. Lawyers love this freedom, because it allows them
to view themselves as heavily affecting the outcome of trials through
their presentation skill and judgment, not merely as bureaucratic
functionaries passing on objective information.
The problem is that the effects of dramatic presentation are not
always benign, or even neutral, as far as the rational process of fact-
finding is concerned. Drama does not merely serve to highlight ra-
tional information, but can also mask or submerge other information
of equal or greater rational weight for which there is no equally dra-
matic means of presentation. The current wisdom derived from ex-
perimental psychology is that humans most commonly process evi-
dence about past human occurrences by constructing story
narratives,96 and more importantly, which narrative account they set-
tle on and how firmly they believe it is heavily influenced by supple-
mentary dramatic factors. In addition, dramatic presentation can
provide a powerful if subtle invitation to the factfinder, not so much
to be irrational per se, but to substitute its own judgment for the law's
judgment about which details of the episode giving rise to the contro-
versy ought to control the outcome, or to change the meaning of the
standard of proof that the law says should control the case. It can, in
other words, be an unstated but effective invitation to jury nullifica-
tion in the general sense, on either side of a controversy, in both civil
and criminal contexts.
While the system's functional allowance of a broad right of ad-
claims it wants done to some other task desired by the advocate. I do not know how to
define the optimal emotional setting and content for delivering the system's truth-finding
promise, or which emotions ought best to be engaged. See Neal R. Feigenson, Sympathy
and LegalJudgment'A Psychological Analysis, 65 TENN. L. REV. 1 (1997). However, it is
easier to know when something has been taken too far.
96. See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision
Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 519 (1991). However, as Professor
Lempert has pointed out, even if the story model is descriptively true of the dominant
mode of processing information about human episodes from evidence, it does not mean
that this is always a good thing. One appropriate response of the law may be to incorpo-
rate rules which ameliorate its potential accuracy-reducing excesses. See Richard Lem-
pert, Telling Tales in Court: Trial Procedure and the Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV.
559,572-73 (1991).
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versary drama thus creates potential problems in all contexts, it is in
its routine utilization by the prosecution against criminal defendants
that the most serious issues come into play, at least if we believe what
we routinely say about our commitment to the presumption of inno-
cence and the notion of proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Hence,
our interest in Old Chief, and judicial admissions in the criminal con-
text, and Wigmore's notion of "legitimate moral force."
It is a commonplace to say that what is meant by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is not capable of exact definition. Nevertheless, de-
spite such perhaps inevitable indeterminacy, there are a few things
that can be said confidently about the notion, at least as it is recog-
nized officially and explicitly by our "search for truth" civic mythol-
ogy.
For one thing, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a standard of
proof explicitly in collision with maximal accuracy of trial results.
This is because it explicitly embraces a value extrinsic to accuracy:
the decision that an inaccurate conviction is worse than an inaccurate
acquittal. The official and explicit recognition of this value judgment
has a long history.
Secondly, it is not clear how much worse an inaccurate convic-
tion is officially, beyond being able to say something like "it's a lot
worse." Most attempts to express the relative evil of such false posi-
tives (convictions) and false negatives (acquittals) have used the well
known aphorism "it is better that (blank) guilty people go free than
that one innocent person be convicted," but the number in the blank
has not always been the same." In its most common form, the num-
97. A true believer in the "judicial combat" or "fair fight" model can rationalize this
easily. It's like two gladiators with different weapons, but sufficiently matched in varying
potentials to yield a satisfying, fair fight. I have a trident and net, you have a sword and
shield. The defendant has the rhetoric of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the
prosecution has heartstrings and gore. The outcome is the result of a fair fight. If the de-
fendant is convicted, that is the outcome. This is all we mean by proof beyond a reason-
able doubt.
98. The earliest use of the aphorism is by Sir John Fortescue in his 1476 treatise De
Laudibus Legumi Angliae, and his phraseology ("revera" meaning "I would prefer") sug-
gests that it was original to him. Fortescue was a remarkably humane jurist in a tumultu-
ous age. The number he used is twenty. SIR JOHN FORTESCU, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM
ANGLIE 65 (S.B. Chrimes trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1942) (1546).
The aphorism next surfaces in Sir Matthew Hale's Pleas of the Crown (written before
his death in 1676 but published posthumously), where the number has shrunk to five. 2
MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 289 (Sollom Emlyn ed..
London, E. & R. Nutt, and R. Gosling 1736). It appears again in Blackstone, where the
number is up to ten. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 352 (Oxford, Clarendon
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ber used is ten, suggesting a requirement of subjective probability in
the low 90s for conviction.' Such empirical research as has been
done indicates that the subjective probability number assigned to the
notion by judges, students, and other citizens varies significantly
within groups and between groups, and is often lower than ninety,"°
though of course such numbers are merely metaphors for non-
quantifiable levels of certainty that may not be related operationally
to the number given.' For instance, while judges assign probability
numbers to the notion of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as high or
higher than the average citizen,"~ there is also some reason to believe
that juries may find reasonable doubt more often than judges would
on the same evidence.03
What is never explicitly suggested, at least in any official source
Press 1769). The reformers of the early 19th century, such as Starkie, raised the number
as high as ninety-nine, and Starkie was dissatisfied with that figure: "The maxim of the
law is, that it is better that ninety-nine (i.e. an indefinite number of) offenders should es-
cape, than that one innocent man should be condemned." 1 THOMAS STARKIE, A
PRACrICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, AND DIGEST OF PROOFS, IN CIVIL
AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS pt. 3, § 76, at 506 (Theron Metcalf & Edward D. Ingraham
eds., 3d Am. ed., Philadelphia, P.H. Nicklin & T. Johnson 1824).
99. The effect of the apparently easy move between ratios and probabilities may be
more complex than it would first appear. See Michael L. DeKay, The Difference between
Blackstone-Like Error Ratios and Probabilistic Standards of Proof, 21 L. & SOC. INQUIRY
95 (1996).
100. See Reid Hastie, Algebraic Models of Juror Decision Processes, in INSIDE THE
JUROR, supra note 60, at 84, 102-03 (summarizing 16 studies on the assignment of prob-
ability values to the notion of truth beyond a reasonable doubt).
101. Thus, it might turn out that while Hale assigned the most conservative number to
the ratio aphorism, he might actually acquit more readily on a given evidentiary record
than Blackstone or Fortescue (if they were all around to be tested). Likewise, persons
who assign a probability number in the 1970s to proof beyond a reasonable doubt may be
more ready to acquit than persons who assign numbers in the 1990s. There is no neces-
sary operational linkage between outputs and such subjective and essentially metaphori-
cal numbers chosen to describe the standard of proof (though we might not be surprised
to find a general attitude correlation at the extremes). This is because the information
upon which the decision is based will in large part not carry quantifiable probability in-
formation. Its range of meaning will be subject to varying estimates between persons de-
pending primarily, not on the stringency of decision criteria, but on varying base rate as-
sumptions derived from varying life experiences.
102. See Hastie, supra note 100, at 102.
103. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISSEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 55-65 (Univ.
of Chicago Press 1971) (1966). This is only in the aggregate. There are likely to be sub-
sets of cases where judges might be less inclined to convict (or prosecutors might think
so), and where, therefore, the prosecution would prefer a jury trial. Further, jury tenden-
cies may have changed in the forty years since the Kalven and Zeissel data were col-
lected, as a result of various social changes.
such as a judicial opinion, so far as I have been able to discover, is
that the level of certainty represented by the rubric "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt" should vary depending on the type of crime or the
horrific details of the individual caseY" Yet this is what I believe is
implicit in Wigmore's notion of "legitimate moral force," and what is
at stake in the law's response to judicial admissions by criminal de-
fendants.
My thought here is that what Wigmore saw as "legitimate moral
104. Not that there has not been manifest hostility to the notion from time to time. In
1785, the early utilitarian William Paley attacked Blackstone's version of the aphorism.
and insisted that the courts not be deterred from conviction by
every suspicion of danger.... They ought rather to reflect, that he
who falls by a mistaken sentence, may be considered as falling for his
country; whilst he suffers under the operation of those rules, by the
general effect and tendency of which the welfare of the community is
maintained and upheld.
WILLIAM PALEY, PRINCIPLES OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY bk. 6, ch. 9, at
455 (n.p., Brett Smith, 5th ed. 1793).
In a similar vein, there is the unsigned 1876 article entitled Some Rules of Evidence:
Reasonable Doubt in Civil and Criminal Cases, 10 AM. L. REV. 642 (1876). attributed by
Wigmore to "Judge May," whose full name is given as "J. Wilder May" in DeKay. supra
note 99, at 96 n.4. "Judge May" as it turns out, is no fan of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, and would reserve it for capital cases. "[M]ercy to the few may be inhumanity to
the many.... Our courts should indeed see to it that the innocent do not suffer: but they
should also see to it that the guilty do not escape." 10 AM. L. REV. at 662. He ends the
article with the Latin aphorism: "Minatur innocentes, qui parcit nocentibus." (He threat-
ens the innocent, who spares the guilty.) Id. at 664.
Finally, I must mention John Kaplan's article which has been credited with being the
catalyst for much of what has been called the "new evidence scholarship." See John
Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065 (1968). De-
cision theory, developed to aid in decisions with weak external normative restraints such
as management decisions, assumes that it is proper for decision makers to assign their
own relative values to outcomes. The almost inevitable result, as Kaplan explicitly ac-
knowledged, would be different standards for different kinds of cases. See id. at 1073-74.
Further, the standards properly would vary from decisionmaker to decisionmaker instead
of at least trying to be the product of the law's imposed notions concerning the relative
disvalue of false positives and false negatives. Kaplan ultimately disavowed (sort of) the
usability of decision theory in modeling legal decisionmaking in most areas for these and
related reasons, but said that decision theory might still be utilized "as servant of the sys-
tem rather than as master." Id. at 1091-92. Others have continued to be fascinated.
There may be ways to derive and incorporate numerical expressions of the law's assump-
tions into the theory, see DeKay, supra note 99, at 114-17, but to what end? In addition,
examining the proof process by getting mock jurors to make subjective utility statements
and deriving the associated probabilities almost inevitably ends up with very low numbers
assigned to the acceptable probability of guilt. See Hastie, supra note 100, at 103-05.
(Personally, I never say "relative disutility," but always "relative disvalue," just to keep a
little Kantian brake on the implications of notions like decision theory.)
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force" was the informationally irrelevant but emotionally gripping
concrete realities of the criminal event out of which engaged con-
demnation could spring. The idea is that to this end the prosecution
has an independent right to show concretely the horror of the crime
through the drama of in-court evidence." Now, I want to put one
idea to rest right at the outset of this discussion. I do not believe that
the effect of horrible concrete evidence is to make jurors vote to con-
vict a person they otherwise affirmatively believe is innocent.'
While this may occur very occasionally, I believe it is rare enough not
to be the effect that legitimately drives argument. What I do believe,
however, is that the horror of the crime changes the operational no-
tion of what constitutes a reasonable doubt. The standard changes
from "Is there a reasonable chance this person did not commit this
crime?" to "If there's a good chance this person did something this
horrible, I'm not voting to put them back on the street," or perhaps,
"If I were the victim who had been through that (or her mother), how
would I feel about this defendant being turned loose on this evi-
dence?"'O'
105. From my perspective, this could as easily be called "illegitimate moral force" or
"inflammatory prejudice," but what do I know?
106. This strawman is set up in Gold, supra note 89, at 505.
107. The recent literature concerning the process of inference and its relation to the
notion of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is vast. Reid Hastie has collected approaches
on the mathematical modeling and social sciences side. See generally INSIDE THE JUROR,
supra note 60. On the legal commentary side, see, for example, Symposium, Cardozo De-
cision and Inference in Litigation Conference, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 253 (1991). Happily,
we need not review in detail nor choose among the various competing schools of thought
for one simple reason: whatever proof beyond a reasonable doubt represents, in theory or
in practice, my claim holds if it is the case that juries will convict more easily when ex-
posed to "heartstrings and gore" evidence than if not so exposed. There are two reasons
to believe that this is so. First, the conclusion of virtually all players in the system is that
juries will so respond. That is why it is generally prosecutors who Want such evidence in
and defense attorneys who want it out. (I concede there are cases where defendants will
seek to make use of analogous evidence, but only to trade on the same assumed effect, to
make the defendant appear more sympathetic or the prosecution more odious.) While it
is possible that everyone's clinically-based belief is wrong, it does not seem reasonable to
act as if it were so in the absence of other evidence. Second, the formal research that ex-
ists tends to confirm the universal instinct. See Saul M. Kassin & David A. Garfield,
Blood and Guts: General and Trial-Specific Effects of Videotaped Crime Scenes on Mock
Jurors, 21 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1459, 1469 (1991) ("In short, it seems that once ju-
rors are exposed to crime scene videotapes, they abandon their demand for proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, and report a willingness to settle for less evidence in order to con-
vict."); see also Clyde Hendrick & David R. Shaffer, Murder: Effects of Number of Killers
and Victim Mutilation on Simulated Jurors Judgments, 6 BULL. OF THE PSYCHONOMIC
SOc'Y 313 (1975); Denise H. Whalen & Fletcher A. Blanchard, Effects of Photographic
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Undoubtedly, it is true that this effect cannot be excluded from
the courtroom in a high percentage of cases. Very often, perhaps
usually, the evidence which precipitates this effect could not be ex-
cluded because it is wrapped up inextricably in the real issues of the
case. Take as an example a stranger-on-stranger rape case in which
the only practically contested issue is identity, and the evidence is
eyewitness identification by the victim. Every detail of the episode is
likely to be relevant to the probability of accurate identification. The
Eumenides"°8 in this case will enter the courtroom uninvited, riding
on the shoulders of otherwise centrally relevant evidence. However,
where they can be excluded, should we recognize their right to a
ticket of admission in their own names? My personal answer to this
is no, and I believe it is also the only answer consistent with what we
claim to be doing when we invoke our commitment to the usual no-
tions of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a truth-finding system.
This is why I say that, even though in Old Chief the Court found the
trial court's rejection of the judicial admission to be error, the opin-
ion is better regarded as a cup half-empty rather than half-full. To
explain this more fully, we must turn to the Old Chief case in detail.
Johnny got his gun ... or did he?: A true crime narrative'"
Johnny Lynn Old Chief was a 30-year-old Blackfoot Indian who
lived on the Blackfoot Reservation in northwestern Montana. On
the afternoon of October 23, 1993, Stacy Everybody Talks About
borrowed a pick-up truck from her friend Marvin England. She then
picked up Jess Crawford, with whom she had a relationship, and an-
other couple, Stephanie Spotted Eagle and Johnny Lynn Old Chief.
Crawford, a car dealer, had brought a bank bag containing money
Evidence on Mock Juror Judgement, 12 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 30 (1982).
108. The Eumenides, or Furies, were the Greek gods of blood retribution. The more
excessive proposals from the victims' rights movement can be seen as attempts to insure
the Eumenides a front row seat. See Robert P. Mosteller, Essay, Victims' Rights and the
United States Constitution: An Effort to Recast the Battle in Criminal Litigation, 85 GEO.
L.J. 1691 (1997).
109. What follows is reconstructed as fairly and neutrally as possible from the state-
ments of fact in the defense and government briefs in the Ninth Circuit, see Brief for Old
Chief, and Brief for United States (on file with author and the Hastings Law Journal). and
in the Supreme Court, see Brief for Old Chief, 1996 WL 279413 at *3, United States v.
Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. 644 (1997) (No. 95-6656) and Brief for United States, 1996 WL
253321 at *2-3, United States v. Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. 644 (1997) (No. 95-6556). and sup-
plemented by trial transcript excerpts as to the events at the baseball diamond and the
abandoned gas station (on file with author and the Hastings Law Journal).
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related to his business and his (legally owned and possessed) 9mm
semi-automatic pistol, which was placed under the front seat before
Old Chief was picked up. The four spent the afternoon drinking a
large amount of beer. Crawford decided he was tired, and Every-
body Talks About dropped him off at home, but he forgot to take his
gun when he got out. Some time after dropping Crawford off, Spot-
ted Eagle took the gun out from under the seat. The three remaining
members of the group then went to a baseball diamond where Old
Chief helped Spotted Eagle fire the gun into the air. There was a
conflict in the testimony of Spotted Eagle and Everybody Talks
About concerning whether Old Chief touched the gun at that time.
Everybody Talks About said that Old Chief handled the gun when he
showed Spotted Eagle how to fire it, but Spotted Eagle said Old
Chief only pointed out to her what to do, without touching the gun.
When they ran out of beer, they drove to a bar called Ick's Place to
buy more. In the parking lot of Ick's they met Anthony Calf Looking
and a friend, who picked a fight with Old Chief. Calf Looking
knocked Old Chief down, and in response to this someone (it was not
altogether clear who) produced the gun and fired a single shot, which
hit no one, but did put a hole in the fender of Calf Looking's Subur-
ban. (Neither Calf Looking nor his friend saw the gun or who fired
it. Spotted Eagle testified that she got the gun from the truck and
fired it to break up the attack on Old Chief. Everybody Talks About
testified that Old Chief fired the gun, but Crawford testified that
Everybody Talks About told him the next day that she herself had
fired the shot. Old Chief did not testify.) At the sound of the shot,
Calf Looking and his friend fled. Old Chief and the two women then
got back in the truck and left, with Everybody Talks About still
driving.
Several moments later, Everybody Talks About pulled into the
parking lot of an abandoned gas station. They were soon joined by
Marvin England and Kim Radassa, who were looking for England's
pick-up, since it had been hours since Everybody Talks About bor-
rowed it. England and Radassa testified that they heard a shot fired
at the gas station, but didn't see who fired it. Spotted Eagle testified
that the gun went off when Everybody Talks About took it out of the
truck and tried to unload it. Everybody Talks About testified that
there was one more discharge of the pistol at the abandoned gas sta-
tion, but she attributed it to Old Chief. However, she admitted on
cross-examination that she had merely heard the shot and not seen it.
If Old Chief fired the shot, then he must have returned to the pick-up
3"an.1998] OLD CFHEF
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
and put the gun away for when, after a few more minutes, police offi-
cers arrived (responding to an earlier phone call from Ick's Place),
they found the pistol in the truck. They arrested Old Chief, and at
the station they seized several rounds of 9mm ammunition and a
spent 9mm shell casing from Old Chief's pocket. The gun was
checked for fingerprints. One useable print was found on the maga-
zine. It was never identified, but it was not Old Chief's. It was never
checked against the fingerprints of Everybody Talks About.
This episode of fairly minor drunken hell raising, in which Old
Chief apparently initiated no violence and no one was hurt, ended up
in federal court and netted Johnny Lynn Old Chief a fifteen-year
prison sentence.""
Here's how: law enforcement on Indian reservations in Montana
is primarily the responsibility of the tribal police,"' but tribal courts
have authority to impose only minor sentences."2 The courts of the
United States have jurisdiction over serious crimes committed on In-
dian reservations, even those by one Indian against another, pursuant
to and as defined by 18 U.S.C. section 1153.13 So Old Chief was
charged in federal court.
If Old Chief were just any defendant, the only arguable felonious
act would have been the discharge of the pistol in the general direc-
tion of Calf Looking after Calf Looking knocked Old Chief down.
That act might be found to be assault with a dangerous weapon, and
since the dangerous weapon was a firearm, it might constitute posses-
sion of a firearm during a crime of violence (he was charged with
both)."4 Or, on the other hand, that act might be found to be a le-
110. Old Chief's fifteen-year sentence was later vacated and remanded for failure to
articulate the grounds for the five-year upward departure from the sentencing guidelines
which it represented. The upward departure seemed related to Old Chief's extensive and
violent juvenile record, but this was explained with insufficient clarity. See United States
v. Old Chief, 121 F.3d 448, 449-52 (9th Cir. 1997) (containing memorandum opinion of
the Ninth Circuit, originally unpublished, but now an appendix to that court's order re-
manding the case to the district court after the Supreme Court's reversal).
111. Congress has provided that a state may assume criminal jurisdiction within In-
dian territory with tribal consent, see 25 U.S.C. § 1321 (1994), but Montana has never
done so, see State ex rel. Flammond v. Flammond, 621 P.2d 471,472 (Mont. 1980).
112. See25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1994).
113. These include "assault with a dangerous weapon." See 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994).
114. See Old Chief v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 644, 647 (1997). It seems odd that
these can be two separate felonies, but it is possible to carry a gun concealed through a
crime of violence in a way that could count as the second and not the first. At any rate,
when there are convictions on both counts arising from a single act, the two crimes are
merged for sentencing purposes under the sentencing guidelines, becoming in effect one
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gitimate act of self-defense utilizing non-deadly force (a warning
shot) to scare away what might reasonably appear to be two attack-
ers. And, of course, a jury could easily have a reasonable doubt that
Old Chief fired the shot at all, given the not implausible testimony of
Spotted Eagle, and the impeachment of Everybody Talks About.
Johnny Lynn Old Chief was not an ordinary defendant, however.
He had previously been convicted of two felonies as an adult.1'5
When he was twenty-one, he had (while drunk) attempted to rob a
tavern with a pistol and was shot (twice) by the bartender for his ef-
forts. He spent just over three years in prison on that conviction.
Not long after his release, he got in a drunken argument at a bar and
stabbed the other participant in the back. For that, he was convicted
of assault resulting in serious bodily injury and spent a little over four
years in prison.116 As a convicted felon, it was a felony for Johnny to
possess any firearm that had ever moved in interstate commerce un-
der 18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(1)." This statute, in its present form,
was enacted in 1968. It must have seemed like a great idea at the
time. Even many committed Second Amendment fans would have a
hard time arguing against making the loss of firearms possession
rights a federally mandated disability of felony conviction. In order
to sustain a conviction under the statute, three elements must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, two of which are status elements,
and one of which is possessory. The status elements are the status of
the gun as a gun which has a connection to interstate commerce, and
crime for sentencing purposes. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 (1996); GERALD T. MCFADDEN, ET
AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING MANUAL 6.05 (1997).
115. Details concerning his prior record were derived from the government's pro-
posed sentencing memorandum. See United States's Proposed Sentencing Memorandum,
United States v. Old Chief (No. Cr. 94-003-GF-PGH) (D. Mont. 1995) and attachments
(on file with author and the Hastings Law Journal).
116. Old Chief was out on supervised release only a few months before the Ick's Bar
incident, and was bound to go back to prison as a result of this episode under any circum-
stances. It was beyond contest that Johnny and his companions had been drinking exten-
sively and that he was quite drunk. Since a condition of his supervised release was that he
avoid being around alcoholic beverages, Old Chief was found to have violated the condi-
tions and returned to prison for two years on that account. See United States v. Old
Chief, 121 F.3d 448, 449-52 (9th Cir. 1997).
117. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1994). Even though Old Chief was an Indian allegedly
possessing the firearm on an Indian reservation, and the offense is not covered by 18
U.S.C. section 1153, it is nevertheless within the jurisdiction of the federal courts, because
it is a general federal criminal statute of unlimited territorial application. See United
States v. Yannott, 42 F.3d 999, 1004 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Young, 936 F.2d
1050,1055 (9th Cir. 1991).
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the status of the defendant as a convicted felon within the meaning of
the statute. The possessory element is the possession of the gun by
the defendant.
Of course it is possible for a defendant to be charged with this
crime alone, and it occasionally happens in circumstances where a
convicted felon is discovered in possession of a gun but has commit-
ted no other federal crime. However, it is at least as common, espe-
cially in the context of the federal role regarding primary criminal ju-
risdiction on Indian reservations (and also in regard to other areas of
federal criminal concern, such as drug trafficking), for the felon-in-
possession charge to be combined with other charges regarding some
other offense which was the primary reason for the defendant's ap-
prehension. This was, of course, the case with Old Chief.
Now consider again, in this concrete context, what a benefit it is
for the government to be blessed with a chargeable predicate felon
count in such a case. Ordinarily, Rule 404(a) would prohibit the in-
troduction of a defendant's prior criminal convictions if the defen-
dant did not choose to testify. The rationale has particular force
when the previous convictions are for crimes which are of the same
kind as the crime now charged. However, assuming nothing is done
to divert the system from its normal course, in a case like Old Chief's
the prosecution will be allowed to show the jury at least one such
conviction, and even if limited to one, the prosecution is free to select
the conviction most similar to the other crime or crimes charged. By
the early 1990s such a pattern had become quite common and had
provoked a constellation of responses among the defense bar, one of
which was the tendering of a judicial admission that the defendant
was a convicted felon within the meaning of the statute."
Put yourself in Old Chief's shoes. He is accused of possession of
a gun at some time on October 23, and also of using that gun in such
a way that it constituted assault upon Calf Looking. The evidence by
no means compels a conclusion that he possessed the gun at any time
(though a factfinder could so find), or that his use against Calf
Looking (if he did have the gun) necessarily constituted an unjusti-
fied assault. If the jury is shown his previous conviction for aggra-
vated assault resulting in grievous bodily injury, that may very well be
the piece of information that dispels their doubt about his possession
118. See Susan W. Callan, Note, Inherent Prejudice of a "Felon-in-Possession" of a
Firearm Trial: Bifurcation, Stipulation, and Jury Instruction as Effective but Judicially Re-
jected Remedies, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 201,223 (1996).
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of the gun at some time during the day, about his possession of it in
the fracas with Calf Looking, and about the purpose and intent with
which it was discharged. If it were practically inescapable that he had
possessed the gun at some time, he could plead guilty to the felon-in-
possession count and totally destroy the government's argument for
introducing the conviction into evidence. However, he is cursed
(perhaps) in having too good a case in regard to the issue of posses-
sion of the gun at all. The evidence all comes from witnesses who
were drunk at the operative times, and is itself ambiguous and con-
tradictory concerning his possession of the weapon. Gee, he might
even be innocent. If he pleads guilty to the felon-in-possession
charge, he is guaranteed a return to prison for a period of at least five
years even if he is acquitted on the remaining charges. What to do?
A judicial admission regarding his status as a convicted felon within
the meaning of the statute.
I trust by now it is becoming clear to the reader why, if one is
ever going to recognize that it is sometimes serious error to reject a
proffered judicial admission, this is the case. The admission is to an
element. The element is a status element having no "res gestae" rela-
tion to the activities constituting the other elements of that crime or
of the other crimes charged. The evidence thus rendered unneces-
sary also has no such relation, and the invocation of any arguable
relevance to commission of the other elements or the other charged
crimes clearly violates a specific and categorical rule of exclusion,
backed by a policy widely repeated and deeply embraced. This is
doubly reinforced in Old Chief's case, since the conviction the prose-
cution wanted to show the jury was for virtually the same thing as the
other crime charged against Old Chief in the current indictment. It is
in this context that four members of the Supreme Court wanted to
affirm the conviction.
We need not dwell overlong on the dissent. Justice O'Connor's
treatment of the defendant's judicial admission as not formally bind-
ing seems disingenuous." 9 It is true that the Devitt and Blackmar
version of the federal model jury instruction, which she cites,"
adopts a permissive inference instruction in regard to mutually
agreed stipulations in criminal cases."' But the Federal Judicial Cen-
119. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 659 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
120. See id.
121. See 1 EDWARD J. DEVITr, ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND
INSTRUCTIONS § 12.03, at 332-34 (4th ed. 1992).
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ter version (which she fails to cite) adopts a mandatory instruction,'2
and presumably neither binds the Supreme Court of the United
States. It is far from clear that a permissive inference instruction is
constitutionally mandated in any context,' 23 and certainly not when a
criminal defendant is requesting a mandatory instruction. The sup-
posed policy behind a permissive inference instruction would be, pre-
sumably, the protection of the right of the accused to a jury determi-
nation. Justice O'Connor compounds the problem by stating that a
plea of not guilty is a plea of the general issue, and therefore no
binding admission can be made to any particular element. Once
again, this sterile formalism overlooks the fact that the general issue
effect of the not guilty plea was historically thought to be a benefit to
the defendant.2 4 Finally, the dissent cites Ulster County v. Allen and
other cases to the effect that a "device must not undermine the fact-
finder's responsibility at trial, based on the evidence adduced, to find
the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt."' 2' However, the dis-
sent again fails to note that the quoted language and the cases sprang
from claims by criminal defendants that the government had invaded
the criminal defendant's constitutionally protected jury trial and due
process rights. To use these statements as if they were statements of
symmetrical adversary rights, to clobber a protesting defendant who
is attempting to waive whatever rights these doctrines represent as
clearly as possible to prevent harm to himself, may make sense to
Justice O'Connor, but not to me. Most importantly, Justice
O'Connor seems willing to concede that a mutually agreed stipulation
can prevent the proffer of evidence by the prosecution, even in the
face of whatever problems are represented by the permissive infer-
ence instruction doctrine. 6 So presumably, the "partial plea of
122. See HON. THOMAS A. FLANNERY ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS (1988). Instruction 12, says that when a fact is
stipulated, the jury is to be told, "There is no disagreement over that, so there was no
need for evidence by either side on that point. You must accept that as fact, even though
nothing more was said about it one way or the other." Id. Without Professor Duane's
citation to this language, I probably would have missed the collision of sources. See
Duane, supra note 12, at 410. The only two circuits whose official manuals of pattern in-
structions dealt with stipulations, the Eighth and the Ninth, adopted the mandatory in-
struction. See 1 HON. LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL) 5.02, at 5-18 (1997).
123. See supra note 14.
124. See Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 355-56.
125. Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 659 (1997) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
126. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 660 (O'Conner, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 49
guilty," which is so foreign to our jurisprudence, is acceptable if the
prosecution agrees to it. Functionally, this is no more than saying
that the right to a jury trial on every formal issue belongs to the gov-
ernment as well as the defense, and that the government may insist
on it under all circumstances.27 And this is no more than saying that
the government has a plenary right to insist on unnecessary formal
proof, even when there is no legitimate probative reason for it and an
illegitimate gain to be gotten from it. In the end, this is what the dis-
sent's position reduces to.
Lurking in the background of the dissent is the fear that the Old
Chief decision might begin to invade the untrammelled functional
discretion of the prosecution to introduce "heartstrings and gore."
The dissenters, unfortunately, probably need not worry. The major-
ity is at extreme pains to separate the "predicate felon" context from
all others, at least all others not involving propensity problems
1 2
127. The dissent's prominent reliance on Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965),
and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(a) also seems misplaced. Singer upheld the
validity of Rule 23(a), allowing the government to insist on a jury trial instead of a bench
trial even when the defendant wanted to waive his jury trial right and have a bench trial.
See Singer, 380 U.S. at 26. Whatever the wisdom of that rule, the result by itself has no
real denial of due process implications, since a jury trial on a contested issue meets due
process requirements. There is a world of difference between allowing the government to
elect a jury over a judge to try contested issues, and allowing it to elect to proffer evi-
dence to a jury on uncontested issues. To extend the language of Rule 23(a) to the latter
situation seems more than a stretch.
128. Since the text emphasizes the "half empty" aspects of the majority opinion in Old
Chief, it should be pointed out that there are significant "half full" aspects as well. First,
the majority makes reasonably clear that inartfully worded admissions which can be fairly
easily cured cannot automatically be used as an excuse to reject the defendant's judicial
admission. Old Chief "offered to stipulate" that he had been convicted of a "crime pun-
ishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" and failed to add "and not oth-
erwise falling within any exception allowed by the statute" or some similar language (to
cover convictions classified by the state as misdemeanors and punishable by less than two
years imprisonment, or certain business crimes). See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 648. Never-
theless, the Court did not view this fixable problem as dispositive. See id. at 648 n.2. Fur-
ther, the Court makes abundantly clear that, under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, any
reliance on an assumed general absolute right of the prosecution to reject "offers to
stipulate" is wrong, at least in relation to propensity evidence. See id. at 651-52. Even
more important, perhaps, is the general recognition that the availability of equally proba-
tive but non-problematical "evidentiary alternatives" is always to be taken into account
under Rule 403, see id. at 652, though the impact of this is substantially diluted by the
parts of the opinion discussed in the text, and by the Court's functional treatment of the
proposed judicial admission as a mere evidentiary admission. See id. at 653. The Court
stated that Old Chief's offer to stipulate would result in "alternative, relevant, admissible
evidence." Id. This move avoided facing the "permissive inference instruction" prob-
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Justice Souter offers what can be analyzed as five intertwined justifi-
cations for the traditional "plenary discretion" rule in any non-
propensity context. In terms so sweeping as to foreclose or discour-
age more detailed analysis, he says that the prosecution can rely on
probable juror expectations to justify introduction of evidence oth-
erwise not analyzably relevant, at least in the face of a proffered judi-
cial admission. 9  While it is true, as noted previously,"" that avoid-
ance of jury speculation under a "two wrongs make a right" principle
can provide a justification for much non-inflammatory irrelevant
normal context information, that is far removed from the sweeping
formulation set out in the opinion. Juries expect to see in large part
what we have taught them to expect to see, or what various narrative
forms of popular culture suggest is the expected way to tell a story.131
I read a lot of true crime books, and I too am very disappointed when
there are no gory pictures of the body to be compared with pictures
of the victim in life. In most cases, I don't think their absence
changes the information on the guilt or innocence of the defendant,
however, and I don't think jurors will either, at least consciously. To
the extent they do so unconsciously, we are back to the operative
meaning of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. To use these sensa-
tional desires and expectations as a general reason to continue prac-
tices as usual, especially where technology continues to increase our
lems, at least directly, but it also (perhaps intentionally) deprived the opinion of clarity
regarding the alternatives available to both the prosecution and court when an "'offer to
stipulate" is made. See id. at 655 n.10. Where does all this leave the Molineux-type pro-
pensity cases upon which the circuits are split? See supra note 37. It would seem clear
that the four dissenters would vote against the Molineux: principle, with or without an ex-
plicit judicial admission. It seems equally clear that the explicit distinction noted in the
text was directed primarily toward "'heartstrings and gore." Would all five majority votes
hold if presented with a Molineux-type case such as United States v. Hadley, 918 F.2d 848
(9th Cir. 1990) (discussed supra note 37) for instance? I would not like to be forced to
bet. However, in January of 1997, the Supreme Court did vacate and remand, supposedly
"in light of" Old Chief, one Molineux-type case in which the defendant had prevailed on
appeal based on a Molineux violation. See U.S. v. Crowder, 87 F.3d 1405 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
rev'd en banc, 141 F.3d 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1998). On May 1, 1998, the D.C. Circuit, en banc.
reversed Crowder 7-4. At least one court has contemplated whether the remand should
be read as a rejection of the Molineux principle. See United States v. Spence. 125 F.3d
1192, 1194-95 (8th Cir. 1997).
129. See Old Chief. 117 S. Ct. at 654.
130. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
131. For an examination of those archetypes, see Ben Harrison's excellent introduc-
tion to BEN HARRISON, TRUE CRIME NARRATIVES: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY at
xv-xli (1997).
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ability to bring ever more graphic and impactive representations into
the courtroom,132 strikes me as going much too far, especially when
the responsibility for depriving the jury of the "heartstrings and gore"
can be placed on the defendant as part of the instructions on any ju-
dicial admission.
But the juror expectations argument is probably secondary. In a
passage of real eloquence heavily influenced, but hardly dictated, by
contemporary narrative theory, Justice Souter intertwines four per-
haps more basic rationales. Before commenting, it is only fair to set
out the passage completely:
The "fair and legitimate weight" of conventional evidence showing
individual thoughts and acts amounting to a crime reflects the fact
that making a case with testimony and tangible things not only sat-
isfies the formal definition of the offense, but tells a colorful story
with descriptive richness. Unlike an abstract premise, whose force
depends on going precisely to a particular step in a course of rea-
soning, a piece of evidence may address any number of separate
elements, striking hard just because it shows so much at once; the
account of the shooting that establishes capacity and causation may
tell just as much about the triggerman's motive and intent. Evi-
dence thus has a force beyond any linear scheme of reasoning, and
as its pieces come together a narrative gains momentum, with
power not only to support conclusions but to sustain the willingness
of jurors to draw the inferences, whatever they may be, necessary
to reach an honest verdict. This persuasive power of the concrete
and particular is often essential to the capacity of jurors to satisfy
the obligations that the law places on them. Jury duty is usually un-
sought and sometimes resisted, and it may be as difficult for one ju-
ror suddenly to face the findings that can send another to prison, as
it is for another to hold out conscientiously for acquittal. When a
juror's duty does seem hard, the evidentiary account of what a de-
fendant has thought and done can accomplish what no set of ab-
stract statements ever could, not just to prove a fact but to establish
its human significance, and so to implicate the law's moral under-
pinnings and a juror's obligation to sit in judgment. Thus, the
prosecution may fairly seek to place its evidence before the jurors,
as much to tell a story of guiltiness as to support an inference of
guilt, to convince the jurors that a guilty verdict would be morally
reasonable as much as to point to the discrete elements of a defen-
dant's legal fault. Cf. United States v. Gilliam...."'
132. See Curriden, supra note 44.
133. Old Chief, 117 S. Ct at 653-54. For a discussion of Gilliam, see supra note 19.
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Eloquent, indeed, but unfortunately also falling into the near
mystical excess of some contemporary narrative theorists. "Evidence
thus has a force beyond any linear scheme of reasoning ..... Con-
ceding this to be true, whatever it means,'34 the question is whether
the force is legitimate? Justice Souter seems to think so. As noted
above, the passage seems to combine elements of four previously met
arguments: the evidence keeps the jury awake and engaged, the evi-
dence lays the foundation for them to intuit truths accurately in ways
we cannot analyze or describe (at least with confidence), the evidence
is necessary to forestall jury nullification, and most importantly. the
evidence "tells a story of guiltiness" as much as "supporting an infer-
ence of guilt."
As to the first two of these arguments, keeping the jury inter-
ested and engaged is a value, but it would seem weak to justify the
excesses of our usual "heartstrings and gore" practices. Like the ju-
ror expectations argument, it quickly comes closer to bread and cir-
cuses (or Christians and lions) than our usual claimed notions of
proper judicial procedure would comfortably embrace. As to the no-
tion that it helps intuit accurately the truths the law says it cares
about, though we can't say how it works, that mystical formula can be
applied to anything, and as such it is globally unpersuasive.' 5
As to anticipation of jury nullification, Justice Souter apparently
has no faith that juries will be up to convicting obviously guilty per-
sons without substantial irrelevant and often inflammatory concrete
context to establish human significance.'3 6 I guess I have more faith
134. This argument appears to be similar to Professor Graham's right brain "'psycho-
logical relevance." See supra note 86. I am perhaps being unfair to Professor Graham.
and I can hear him saying, "That isn't what I meant at all." (Another manifestation of the
law of unintended consequences, perhaps.) Certainly his pungent observations on many
of the cases admitting heartstrings and gore evidence in the supplement to Wright & Gra-
ham. supra note 72, indicate that he is not a fan of the current general admissibility of
such evidence in favor of the prosecution. But, given his notion of psychological rele-
vance. I am not sure what he can say in objection, in any statable, i.e. linear or left brain.
way. beyond saying that it just takes the joke too far.
135. Any attempt to argue against this notion will be attacked as the product of a
mind that is just too linear. I am reminded of the last line of Wittgenstein's Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." LUDWIG
WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS 189 (C.K. Ogden ed. and trans.,
1949) (1922).
136. I understand the argument that the defendant will inevitably be humanized by
the jurors, since they will be in the defendant's physical presence, sometimes for extended
periods, and that the system needs a mechanism to communicate parallel humanity for
the victims of the charged crime to insure that the jury does not perceive its decision to be
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in juries than Justice Souter. More troubling, he seems to embrace
the widest possible version of the "anticipation of nullification" ar-
gument, that is, he applies it generally as an assumption to the trial of
every case. As previously noted,"' one would think that the prosecu-
tion ought to be required at least to make out some more particular
and substantial reason to fear jury nullification in fact, before such an
argument would even be entertained. 1
Those three arguments are, in form, instrumental. If we could
finally show that jurors would maintain attention without such evi-
dence, or that it does not affect or decrease factual accuracy of result,
or that jurors would do their (rational) duty without such evidence,
the arguments would fail. The last argument, however, is normative.
It asserts the propriety of telling a story of guiltiness as well as of
guilt for its own sake. As such, it would appear to sanction "heart-
strings and gore" as an end in itself. Well, perhaps not. In describing
what constitutes a "story of guiltiness" Justice Souter concentrates on
''an account of what a defendant has thought and done." Since
"heartstrings and gore" usually is not relevant to "what the defendant
has thought and done," at least in the context of pure identity cases
(unless you assume the defendant is guilty), perhaps the passage was
not directed toward such evidence generally. I wouldn't bet on this
argument, however. The last line of the passage goes on that it is
proper to offer evidence "to convince the jurors that a guilty verdict
would be morally reasonable as much as to point to the discrete ele-
ments of a defendant's legal fault."'3 9 Here is Wigmore's "legitimate
moral force," and the Eumenides' ticket of admission in their own
right. This, apparently, is the truth we seek. The dissenters need not
one choosing between a human and other merely non-human policies. The current prac-
tices that are protected by the quoted language, however, go far beyond anything neces-
sary for such a function. No beginning on restructuring our ideas of proper presentation
can occur as long as appellate courts shirk their responsibility to supervise that restruc-
turing by invoking notions of trial court discretion and justify current practice with pas-
sages such as the one quoted in the text.
137. See supra note 64.
138. Even such a limiting principle is capable of easy abuse, as the prosecution might
routinely claim to fear "jury nullification" simply as the result of a (rationally) weak case.
The result of such an argument, if accepted, would be to exclude "heartstrings and gore"
except in close cases, which would seem the exact opposite of the proper result. A similar
circumstance already prevails in some courts where the "probative value" of uncharged
misconduct evidence is reinforced by the "need" of the prosecution, so that it comes in
more easily in close cases. Most courts appear generally to reject this argument. See
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 11, § 8:17.





Which finally brings us back to the McVeigh case, and to the
end. The popular conception of the McVeigh trial was that it was a
perfect paragon of the way trials should be run, in contrast to the O.J.
Simpson trial. For example, Rikki Klieman of Court TV, an experi-
enced and intelligent defense attorney in her own right, continually
referred to the prosecution as "poetry in motion" and to the presid-
ing judge as "a judge's judge." Citations could be multiplied. I
watched numerous panel discussions during the trial, all involving at
least some defense attorneys, and each had references to the prosecu-
tion's "brilliant" presentation, especially its beginning the case play-
ing an amplified taped phone call which caught the actual explosion,
and the alternation of what I might call the relevant evidence with
victims' relatives called for the sole purpose of establishing the un-
disputed death of loved ones in the explosion. The fact that Judge
Matsch put some solomonic limits on how extensively they could tes-
tify in the guilt phase seemed to satisfy everybody. Well, not me. I
dissent. However, first let me say that I think the actual evidence
against McVeigh was overwhelming, and these public morality play
excesses were harmless error. Be that as it may, what if the evidence
of McVeigh's participation had been weaker, the case a closer one in
regard to tenable reasonable doubt? How should we regard a convic-
tion then? Would it not be much more defensible if obtained without
"heartstrings and gore" evidence irrelevant to the defendant's par-
ticipation in the bombing? But, you may counter, he might not have
been convicted then. My point exactly.'
4
1
140. So the circuits have understood the case. See United States v. Rezaq. 134 F.3d
1121, 1137-38 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Gonzalez v. DeTella, 127 F.3d 619, 621-22 (7th Cir. 1997).
Even felon-in-possession defendants with improperly rejected admissions have not fared
well in cases decided after Old Chief- three quarters of these appeals have been affirmed
on harmless error grounds - only three of twelve have resulted in reversals. For harmless
error, see United States v. Daniel, 134 F.3d 1259 (6th Cir. 1998): United States v. Cun-
ningham, 133 F.3d 1070 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Harris, 130 F.3d 829 (8th Cir.
1997), vacated on reh g No. 97-1812, 1998 WL 86555 (8th Cir. Mar. 3, 1998); United States
v. Moore, 129 F.3d 989 (8th Cir. 1997): United States v. Taylor, 122 F.3d 685 (8th Cir.
1997); United States v. Horsman, 114 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Arm-
strong, 112 F.3d 342 (8th Cir. 1997); Redding v. United States, 105 F.3d 1254 (8th Cir.
1997); LaForce v. United States, 976 F. Supp. 402 (W.D. Va. 1997) (motion to vacate dis-
missed). For reversals, see United States v. Parrish, No. 96-5756, 1997 WL 650921 (6th
Cir. Oct. 16, 1997) (unpublished disposition): United States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450
(9th Cir. 1997): United States v. Blake, 107 F.3d 651 (8th Cir. 1997).
141. The trial of Terry Nichols for the Oklahoma City bombing was closer to this




Criminal cases between 1905 and 1923 dealing with the effect of
formal or practical judicial admission by a criminal defendant:
State v. Lewis, 116 N.W. 606 (Iowa 1908). Defendant hit victim
with a pick during an argument at work. Defendant admitted striking
deceased in head with pick and wanted to exclude the pick and a por-
tion of deceased's skull showing hole. Evidence properly admitted.
State v. Young, 96 P. 1067 (Or. 1908). Defendant admitted
shooting down unarmed victim (whom he suspected of having an af-
fair with his estranged wife) in a barroom "to prevent the felony of
adultery." His objection to evidence concerning the nature of the
wounds overruled. Court said prosecution is always free to reject
admissions. (His claim that the defense of prevention of felony ap-
plied in these circumstances was likewise rejected.)
State v. Moore, 102 P. 475 (Kan. 1909). Defendant waylaid his
estranged wife on the way home from church and shot her. His de-
fense was temporary insanity. Wife's bloody jacket was introduced
and left hanging in view of the jury for "five or six days." No error,
State not bound by defendant's admissions.
Williams v. State, 136 S.W. 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1911). Homi-
cide. The cause of death and nature and position of wounds not be-
ing in dispute, error to admit victim's bloody clothes. This is one of
the line of Texas cases based on Cole v. State, 75 S.W. 527 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1903).
Lacoume v. State, 143 S.W. 626 (Tex. Crim. App. 1912). Assault
with intent to murder growing out of altercation with policeman.
Striking of policeman on head admitted, defense of self defense. Er-
ror to admit policeman's bloody clothes since volume of blood on
them was irrelevant and they did not show the position of any
wounds. Also based on Cole v. State.
sion and did not seek to exclude all evidence of the fact of death of each victim, but
merely to limit it very narrowly. See generally Nichols' Motion in Limine Concerning Vic-
tim Identification Testimony, United States v. Nichols, No. 96-CR-68-M, 1997 WL 677321
(D. Colo. Oct. 24, 1997). Judge Matsch did not grant the motion in the terms sought.
However, motivated presumably at least in part by the fact that the case against Nichols
was closer than that against McVeigh, Judge Matsch allowed less latitude for heartstrings
and gore in the Nichols trial. As Michael Christian of Court TV, who was in the court-
room at both trials, reported on December 2, 1997, Judge Matsch "cut back" substantially
on the emotional evidence. Still, plenty was allowed in.
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Chapman v. State, 147 S.W. 580 (Tex. Crim. App. 1912). Assault
with intent to murder. Defendant admitted that he had shot the vic-
tim three times in the back and that each shot produced a grievous
wound. It was error to allow physician to use the victim's living body
as a prop for illustrating testimony concerning wounds. Another in
the Cole v. State line of cases.
Corley v. State, 155 S.W. 227 (Tex. Crim. App. 1913). Aggra-
vated assault. Plea of self defense. Since the nature and location of
victim's wound was undisputed, it was error to introduce victim's
bloody coat. Another Cole v. State case.
Commonwealth v. Wendt, 102 A. 27 (Pa. 1917). Defendant shot
a police officer in the woods, admitted shooting, and claimed self de-
fense. Prosecution was allowed to put in uncharged misconduct to
show motive for the shooting. The court bases its decision on the as-
sertion that the prosecution is not bound by a defense admission,
though it could easily have decided as it did without that reasoning.
Dozier v. State, 199 S.W. 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 1917). Murder
prosecution. Victim was killed by a single shot in the back. Nature
and location of wounds undisputed. Error to allow display of victim's
bloody clothes to illustrate testimony, even if they were not formally
admitted in evidence. Another Cole v. State case.
State v. Stansberry, 166 N.W. 359 (Iowa 1918). Murder trial.
Defendant admitted manner of death and nature and location of the
wounds, wanted to keep out the bloody clothes of deceased. Court
explicitly rejects the Texas cases growing out of Cole v. State, finds
"no abuse of discretion" in admitting clothes.
State v. Weaver, 166 N.W. 379 (Iowa 1918). Charge was at-
tempted rape of 12-year-old, applied Molineux principle, excluded
prior incidents to prove intent. This case is factually similar to State
v. Vance, 94 N.W. 204 (Iowa 1903).
White v. State, 202 S.W. 737 (Tex. Crim. App. 1918). Assault
with intent to murder. The nature and extent of stab wounds being
undisputed, it was error to exhibit the bloody clothing of the victim to
illustrate testimony on the point. Another Cole v. State case.
State v. Gilligan, 103 A. 649 (Conn. 1918). Murder by poison.
Facts very much like Molineux. Uncharged misconduct to prove in-
tent excluded. (No formal admission.)
Alexander v. State, 204 S.W. 644 (Tex. Crim. App. 1918). De-
fendant charged with bootlegging. He admitted transferring liquor to
the investigator, but claimed he only did it as an accommodation to
the investigator's instigation (entrapment). Court found that it was
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error to allow introduction and display of the sixteen bottles one by
one. This is another Cole v. State case.
State v. Campbell, 104 A. 653 (Conn. 1918). Defendant charged
with perjury in previous criminal case. Prosecution wanted to admit
a lot of surrounding testimony (which independently cast defendant
in a bad light) to show "materiality" of the asserted perjury. Defen-
dant admitted materiality and stood on the defense of truth. Prose-
cution not bound by defense admission.
State v. Strum, 169 N.W. 373 (Iowa 1918). Molineux-type case.
Charge was receiving stolen goods. Defendant denied ever having
goods, but admitted that if he ever had the goods, he had them "in-
tentionally and knowingly" as far as their stolen status. Such admis-
sion prevents introduction of uncharged misconduct to show intent
and knowledge.
State v. Porter, 207 S.W. 774 (Mo. 1918). Court finds that lower
court should not have admitted bloody clothes after admission of
cause of death and nature of wounds, but concludes that it was
harmless error.
State v. Morgan, 176 N.W. 35 (S.D. 1920). Incest case. Defen-
dant admitted knowing that victim was his niece, marrying her, and
living together with her under the same roof in an attempt to keep
out letters bragging about his relationship. The letters were admitted
anyway. The opinion properly distinguished this situation from State
v. Strum, saying that the admission, though it went pretty far, did not
actually admit the intercourse that the letters were introduced to
show.
People v. Munday, 127 N.E. 364 (Ill. 1920). Fraud case. Defen-
dant admitted insolvency and knowledge. Uncharged misconduct
admitted anyhow. Court generally rejected Molineux rationale ap-
plied to admissions, and said that State was free to put in its proof.
State v. Kappen, 180 N.W. 307 (Iowa 1920). Chutzpah award
case. Charge was possession of burglar's tools. Defendant denied
possession, but admitted that if he possessed them, they were pos-
sessed "designedly." On that basis, the trial court kept out uncharged
misconduct evidence, over the prosecution's objection, but defendant
was convicted anyhow. On appeal, he argued that the admission was
insufficient to make out the required intent. The court ruled that it
was not, but took the occasion to overrule State v. Strum and State v.
Weaver.
People v. Sindici, 201 P. 975 (Cal. Ct. App. 1921). Prosecution
for forgery. Defendant admitted forged nature of note, but claimed
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he did not sign it and admitted that whoever signed the note was a
knowing forger. Prosecution nevertheless proceeded to show defen-
dant's other forgeries to show "intent." Court said prosecution had
absolute right to reject such an admission. Case rejected Molineux
approach in identification cases.
Maddox v. State, 189 N.W. 398 (Neb. 1922). Murder case. Farm
hand shot farmer after not being rehired. Defense of insanity. De-
fendant wanted to exclude all eyewitnesses to the actual shooting.
whose testimony was admitted. This would clearly be unjustified, as
the quality of his actions during episode was relevant on the issue of
insanity. However, the court relied on the flat statement that the
prosecution was not bound by the admissions of the defense.
NOTE: The admission of bloody clothes on uncontested issues in
Texas was found to be "not ordinarily considered error justifying a
reversal" in Trigg v. State, 269 S.W. 782, 783 (Tex. Crim. App. 1925).
Cole v. State has not been cited in a Texas case since 1940.
